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AUTONOMOUS BUSINESS REALITY
Carla L. Reyes*
Society tends to expect technology to do more than it can actually achieve, at
a faster pace than it can actually move. The resulting hype cycle infects all forms
of discourse around technology. Unfortunately, the discourse on law and technology is no exception to this rule. The resulting discussion is often characterized by
two or more positions at opposite ends of the spectrum, such that participants in
the discussion speak past each other, rather than to each other. The rich context
that sits in the middle ground goes disregarded altogether. This dynamic most recently surfaced in the legal literature regarding autonomous businesses. This Article seeks to fill the gap in the current discussion by creating a taxonomy of autonomous businesses and using that taxonomy to demonstrate that automation,
standing alone, is not what makes autonomous businesses exceptional. Rather, the
capacity of autonomous businesses to make radical governance changes more
prevalent in the market pushes the boundaries of current choice of entity and governance paradigms while also illuminating low-technology functional equivalents
that may offer more traditional businesses a path to governance reform.
To make these claims, this Article begins in Part I by briefly introducing the
two emerging technologies that enable business automation. Part II reviews the
existing literature and argues that by focusing on only one specific segment of the
current autonomous business landscape, the literature misses key opportunities to
evolve business law. Part III builds a map of existing autonomous businesses,
demonstrating the differences among them and explaining them as a function of
design trade-offs. Part III then uses that map to build a taxonomy of autonomous
businesses and offers a framework for considering the broader impacts of
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Schools 2019 Business Law Works-in-Progress Session for insightful and tremendously helpful feedback. I am equally indebted to: key insights from Margaret Blair, Micah Schwartzman,
Elizabeth Pollman, James Nelson, Sarah Haan, Mihailis Diamantis, and Gabriel Rauterberg
provided during the 2019 University of Houston Law Center’s Business Law Works-in-Progress Roundtable; feedback from Ben Edwards, Nicole Inanarone, Christopher Bradley, Kristin Johnson, and Mihailis Diamantis provided during the 2019 MSU-Tulane Business Law and
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autonomous businesses on law. Part IV examines ways that autonomous business
reality may incentivize reforms in traditional corporations while simultaneously
emphasizing the need for continued research and innovation in choice of business
entity, organizational governance, and regulatory compliance.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 438
I. A (VERY) BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO BLOCKCHAIN AND ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE...................................................................................... 443
A. Blockchain Technology ................................................................ 444
B. Artificial Intelligence ................................................................... 448
II. AUTONOMOUS BUSINESSES OF THE FUTURE: EXPECTATIONS FOR
BLOCKCHAIN AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO TRANSFORM
BUSINESS ............................................................................................. 451
A. Autonomous Businesses and Business Organizational Law ........ 452
B. Autonomous Businesses and Corporate Governance .................. 457
III. AUTONOMOUS BUSINESS REALITY: A TAXONOMY TO HELP LAW
ACCOUNT FOR THE FULL SPECTRUM OF AUTONOMOUS BUSINESSES . 461
A. Understanding Differences Between Autonomous Businesses
as Design Tradeoffs ..................................................................... 462
B. Identifying Trends in Autonomous Businesses to Illuminate
True Differences........................................................................... 472
C. Automation Is Not What Makes Autonomous Businesses
Exceptional .................................................................................. 476
IV. WHAT AUTONOMOUS BUSINESS REALITY MIGHT TEACH .................. 481
A. Autonomous Business Reality Might Incentivize LowTechnology Traditional Plus Corporate Governance Reform..... 481
B. Autonomous Business Reality May Enable More Efficient
Business Regulation ..................................................................... 487
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 489

INTRODUCTION
U.S. public companies frequently ask shareholders to make certain decisions
via vote.1 To facilitate the voting process and accurately tabulate the votes cast,
U.S. corporate governance embraced a complex system known as the “proxy

1

Anne Sheehan & John C. Coates, Proxy Plumbing Recommendation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 10, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/09/10/proxy-plu
mbing-recommendation/ [perma.cc/8BTH-XHWG] (“Over 600 billion shares are voted every
year at more than 13,000 shareholder meetings, including more than 3,000 at SEC-registered
operating companies.”).
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system.”2 The primary goal of the proxy system lies in providing “accurate,
timely and cost-effective vote counts” in a transparent and accessible manner
that reduces fraud and increases informed voting.3 Unfortunately, many agree
that systemic problems in the proxy system prevent it from achieving this goal.4
Specifically, shareholders,5 c-suite executives,6 regulators,7 judges,8 and academics all lament the various ways the proxy system lacks accuracy and transparency.9 Although the technology exists (and has existed for quite some time) to
make the proxy system more efficient, no system-wide upgrades have been undertaken.10 Some view the failure to technologically upgrade the proxy system
as a misalignment of incentives, and argue that absent some form of legislative
or regulatory intervention, the difficulties now inherent in the proxy system will
continue unabated.11
Meanwhile, companies willing to experiment with emerging technologies
are quietly testing systems built on blockchain technology and artificial intelligence that promise to radically improve the proxy system.12 Although some
quickly dismiss the notion that applications of blockchain technology can

2

Id. (“Shareholders typically vote via agents known as proxies, subject to oversight and regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As described in the overview in
Annex A, shares are commonly owned in ‘stacks’ or chains of contracts through intermediaries
or agents such as custodians, broker-dealers, banks, and transfer agents, many of which are
regulated by the SEC. Many participants outsource some or all aspects of voting to third parties. The overall system of voting, proxies, intermediation, and third-party services will be
referred to in this recommendation as the ‘proxy system.’ ”).
3
Id.
4
See, e.g., id.; Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 61 BUS. LAW. (ABA) 1011, 1014 (2006);
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 682 (2007);
Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 906 (2007).
5
Sheehan & Coates, supra note 1, at n.6 (relating testimony from Ken Bertsch of the Council
of Institutional Investors that “[t]he current system of proxy voting is fraught with inefficiencies and a too-large margin for error.”).
6
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ROUNDTABLE ON THE PROXY PROCESS 43–46 (2018) (relating
testimony from Bob Schiffelite, CEO of Broadridge and Paul Conn, CEO of Computershare
testifying about the need for stronger vote confirmation requirements).
7
Id. at 20, 22, 32–37.
8
See, e.g., In re Dole Food Co., Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL 624843,
at *4 n.1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017).
9
See Hu & Black, supra note 4; Bebchuk, supra note 4; Rose, supra note 4.
10
Sheehan & Coates, supra note 1 (“Many observers of the proxy system see a potential path
toward comprehensive reform in the form of improved technologies. . . . It should be noted,
however, that the basic technologies necessary for tracking shares and votes—essentially a
spreadsheet plus electronic communication—have been available for decades.”).
11
Id. (“Rather than technological impediments, it is incentives and private interests (as affected by existing regulation), coupled with the externalities of networks, which have prevented moving the U.S. proxy system onto a single, reformed technological platform.”).
12
See Preferred Blockchain, SECURITIZE, https://www.securitize.io/product/blockchain [http
s://perma.cc/66S6-RDJ9].
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improve the regulation and functioning of capital markets,13 most such commentators focus their attention on either the problematic aspects of public blockchain
protocols14 or the weakness of certain permissioned systems.15 This singular focus on a binary divide between public blockchain protocols and permissioned
systems ignores industry reality, where some of the leading solutions operate as
protocol-agnostic middleware.16 Indeed, the discussion about technologically remodeling the proxy system represents just one area in which literature at the intersection of business law and technology ignores industry’s current state of the
art. For example, in the broader discussion of corporate governance reforms,
scholars generally consider either low-technology governance reforms, or technology’s ability to disrupt traditional business structures and governance mechanisms,17 and only rarely do scholars consider both.18 In other words, the existing
academic discourse fails to adequately consider the ways in which technology
and law might work together to innovate in the realms of business entity structure
and corporate governance.
Part of this failure to consider the full, rich tapestry of technological innovation stems from the age-old difficulty of separating hype from fiction before investigating the intersection of law and technology. For example, literature at the
intersection of law and technology often forecasts the trajectory of technology in
order to consider whether existing law can deal with coming societal changes.19
13

See, e.g., Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A
Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 842, 848–55
(2015).
14
Id. at 844, 869–874.
15
See, e.g., Jeff John Roberts, JP Morgan Alums Launch ‘Blockchain as a Service’ on AWS,
FORTUNE (Jan. 23, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/01/23/blockchain-aws-kadena/
[https://perma.cc/Q7YR-P6PG]; Park Bramhall, Blockchain Isn’t Always the Solution (or
Why Tokenizing Equity Securities Is Not the Answer to the Proxy Voting Problem) 1, 3–4
(June 19, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3393774 [perma.c
c/BB2W-72UZ].
16
See, e.g., Preferred Blockchain, supra note 12.
17
See, e.g., Wulf A. Kaal & Samuel Evans, Blockchain-Based Securities Offerings, 20 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 89, 89, 92, 96–98 (2019); Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance, 4 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 3, 5–7 (2020) [hereinafter Kaal, BlockchainBased Corporate Governance]; Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in
Corporate Governance, in ECONOMIC INFORMATION TO FACILITATE DECISION MAKING (Kashi
R. Balachandran ed., 2019); Alexandra Andhov, Corporations on Blockchain: Opportunities
& Challenges, 53 CORNELL INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1, 29, 31–32) (on file
with author).
18
For exceptions that do consider how law and technology can work together for positive
reform, see George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227,
227–31, 267–76 (2018); Federico Panisi et al., Blockchain and Public Companies: A Revolution in Share Ownership Transparency, Proxy Voting and Corporate Governance?, 2 STAN.
J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 189, 202–03, 216–18 (2019).
19
See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND.
L.J. 1401, 1403–05, 1407, 1410–17 (2017); Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines:
The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 17–18, 22–25, 29–31, 44, 49–51,
54–55 (2019).
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Of course, it is also common for entrepreneurs building the technology to tout
their advances in bold terms for marketing purposes.20 Sensationalism related to
the capacity of emerging technology runs wide and deep. Reality lies somewhere
in the gap between entrepreneurial visions of tech-utopia and legal visions of
powerful data-overlords wreaking havoc on democratic society. For so long as
reality lives in this gap, it remains hidden from systematic investigation by legal
academics. Why does the gap persist? It is, quite simply, difficult to map out the
current landscape of emerging technology usage, and even harder to do so before
the landscape changes.21
By allowing the lacuna in the literature to persist, legal scholarship foregoes
key discussions and misses pivotal opportunities to shape the interplay between
law and technology. In the literature on business law and autonomous technologies (including blockchain technology and artificial intelligence), for example,
U.S. legal scholars inquired for several years whether and how fully autonomous
businesses could become formally recognized legal entities.22 Meanwhile, one
20

For an infamous example, consider the story told by Slock.it, the software development
team behind the decentralized venture capital firm known as “The DAO,” see infra notes 197–
208 and accompanying text, which boldly proclaimed (roughly paraphrasing) that “The DAO
is code, and the code is the contract.” See also Will Dunn, The Rise and Fall of The DAO, the
First Code-Based Company, NEW STATESMAN TECH (July 22, 2016), https://tech.newstatesma
n.com/feature/dao-code-based-company [perma.cc/GK5K-T3AG].
21
Indeed, the rich complexity of reality holds lessons for legal scholars in a variety of fields,
even though reality in those fields often goes unexplored. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 716 (2019) (“This Article aims to shed light on the
broad spectrum of corporate disobedience to show the true complexity of this activity and to
suggest that, to the extent that innovation or legal change can benefit society, some corporate
disobedience could at least have the potential to provide value.”); Harry Surden, Artificial
Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1305, 1306 (2019) (“A key motivation in writing this article is to provide a realistic, demystified view of AI that is rooted in
the actual capabilities of the technology. This is meant to contrast with discussions about AI
and law that are decidedly futurist in nature. That body of work speculates about the effects of
AI developments that do not currently exist and which may, or may not, ever come about.
Although those futurist conversations have their place, it is important to acknowledge that they
involve significant, sometimes unsupported, assumptions about where the technology is
headed. That speculative discussion often distracts from the important, but perhaps less exotic,
law and policy issues actually raised by AI technology today.” (footnote omitted)); Andrew
D. Selbst, A Mild Defense of Our New Machine Overlords, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 87, 93
(2017) [hereinafter Selbst, Machine Overlords] (“Ultimately, the difficulties with the argument Brennan-Marquez presents stem from the limitations of this hypothetical technology.
Had he instead considered a more realistic technology, his arguments would have had to
change considerably.”); Carliss N. Chatman, Myth of the Attorney Whistleblower, 72 SMU L.
REV. 669, 675, 693–94, 703–10 (2019) (arguing that only by looking at the realities of corporate legal practice can the failure of the SEC whistleblower regime to check corporate fraud
be fully explained).
22
See, e.g., Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 94–96 (2015) [hereinafter Bayern,
Autonomous Systems] (describing several mechanisms for organizing an autonomous businesses entity and arguing that an LLC may offer the best fit); Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins,
Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1485, 1485,
1495–98 (2014) [hereinafter Bayern, Of Bitcoins] (describing how an LLC might become a
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decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) looked to law outside of the
United States for an answer. The Dash DAO organized a New Zealand-based
irrevocable trust—the Dash DAO Irrevocable Trust, or the Dash Trust—to create
a formally recognizable governance structure, enable Dash the capacity to own
property, and facilitate contracting.23 A different kind of DAO, dOrg LLC, used
a specifically tailored business formation statute to gain formal legal recognition,
becoming the first Vermont Blockchain-Based Limited Liability Company
(BBLLC) in June 2019.24
Both of these businesses are pioneering new ways of thinking about autonomous technology and business organizations. Nevertheless, they do not fit
neatly within earlier scholarly discussions of autonomous businesses, which
seemed to assume that businesses built on emerging technology would automate
people out of the business altogether.25 Instead, both the Dash Trust and dOrg
LLC rely on people to a significant extent, using technology to automate many,
but not all processes necessary to operate the business.26 For example, dOrg LLC
describes itself as a cooperative of freelance software engineers.27 As a worker
cooperative, the software engineering business operated by dOrg LLC is owned
and controlled by the freelancers who contribute to the business, with profits
distributed to members based on how much they work for dOrg LLC.28 In other
words, the early literature on autonomous businesses and entity formation speculated on the trajectory of the technology, foreseeing a rate of development that
even the most cutting-edge companies currently in the industry have not

vehicle for granting autonomous software private legal personhood); Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887, 906–24 (2018) [hereinafter LoPucki, Algorithmic
Entities] (describing several ways for “algorithmic entities” to organize as formal business
entities).
23
Ryan Taylor, Dash Core Group Legal Structure Details, DASH F. (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/dash-core-group-legal-structure-details.39848/#post-19
3885 [perma.cc/7TYY-3ALP]. The Dash Trust chose New Zealand “for its strong reputation
and well-defined trust laws.” Id.
24
John Biggs, dOrg Founders Have Created the First Limited Liability DAO, COINDESK
(June 11, 2019, 10:00 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/dorg-founders-have-created-the-firstlimited-liability-dao [perma.cc/86FW-WUMJ].
25
See, e.g., Bayern, Of Bitcoins, supra note 22; LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, supra note 22.
26
Notably, I have argued elsewhere that blockchain-based businesses such as the Dash Trust
and dOrg LLC could also organize as a business trust under U.S. law in order to gain formal
legal entity recognition. Carla L. Reyes, If Rockefeller Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
373, 410, 412 (2019). My approach there was not to make any predictions about the trajectory
of the technology, but rather to demonstrate a pathway to legal entity status that might accommodate blockchain-based businesses, whether they involved humans or not—an approach as
equally applicable to current industry efforts as to future possibilities. Id. at 428.
27
dOrg, GITHUB, https://github.com/dOrgTech [perma.cc/S9G8-JXFM].
28
JIM JOHNSON & BRENT EMERSON, A TECHNOLOGY FREELANCER’S GUIDE TO STARTING A
WORKER COOPERATIVE 5 (2009), https://www.techworker.coop/sites/default/files/TechCoop
HOWTO.pdf [perma.cc/C6CT-W35D]).
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developed or adopted.29 And so, the gap between the reality of the people-driven
work of the Dash Trust and dOrg LLC and the visions of a human-less future
business world persists.30
This Article investigates the full panoply of autonomous technology implemented by existing businesses to uncover the full spectrum of autonomous business reality. To that end, the Article maps out the current landscape of autonomous businesses and uses the map to build a taxonomy that opens up further
analysis. In doing so, this Article reveals that the meaningful impact of autonomous businesses for business law lies in the new economically productive organizational models enabled by the technology, rather than the mere use of technology to automate some specific business function. Specifically, this Article argues
that only by considering the full spectrum of automation in business does the true
import of autonomous technologies for business law emerge. In particular, the
capacity of autonomous businesses to make radical governance changes more
prevalent in the market pushes the boundaries of current choice of entity and
governance paradigms while also challenging traditional theories of corporate
governance. Indeed, the autonomous business taxonomy may serve as a vehicle
for incentivizing traditionally centralized and hierarchical businesses to adopt
many of the low-technology corporate governance reforms suggested in existing
literature.
To make these claims, this Article begins in Part I by briefly introducing the
two emerging technologies that enable business automation on an unprecedented
scale: blockchain technology and artificial intelligence. Part II argues that by focusing on only one specific segment of the current autonomous business landscape, the existing literature misses key opportunities to evolve business law in
the areas of entity structure and corporate governance. Part III builds a map of
existing autonomous businesses, demonstrating the differences among them and
explaining them as a function of design trade-offs made by founders, owners,
and managers. Part III then uses that map to build a taxonomy of autonomous
businesses and offers a framework for considering broader impacts of autonomous businesses on law. Part IV uses that framework to examine the ways that
autonomous business reality may incentivize reforms in traditional corporations
while simultaneously emphasizing the inverse need for continued research, regulation, and innovation at the intersection of autonomous technology and business law.
I.

A (VERY) BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO BLOCKCHAIN AND ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE

This Part offers a very brief introduction to two of the key emerging technologies enabling increased corporate automation: blockchain technology and
29

See Bayern, Autonomous Systems, supra note 22, at 96–97, 108; LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, supra note 22, at 897–98.
30
For further discussion of the Dash Trust and dOrg, see infra Section II.A.
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artificial intelligence. Blockchain technology, in connection with smart contracts, enables new levels of automation in scenarios that previously required a
trusted third-party intermediary. Further, corporations frequently incorporate artificial intelligence into products and services in order to leverage efficiency, accuracy, and cross-selling opportunities. Increasingly, artificial intelligence is
making its way from the product-side of corporations to the management-side.31
Understanding these technological building blocks of the new corporate infrastructure is imperative for analyzing whether and to what extent autonomous
businesses can shed new light on the decades old debates regarding the role of
business organizations in structuring commercially productive enterprise and the
appropriate mechanics of corporate governance.
A. Blockchain Technology
Blockchain technology is one type of distributed database known broadly as
distributed ledger technology (DLT).32 Researchers describe a distributed ledger
as a “type of distributed database that assumes the possible presence of malicious
users (nodes).”33 Although commonly used interchangeably with DLT, the term
blockchain more precisely refers to a sub-set of DLT protocols that structure their
data in a literal “chain of blocks” by linking blocks of validated transactions together using one-way cryptographic hashes.34 The combination and implementation of specific technological elements, such as the type of consensus
31

Michael R. Siebecker, Making Corporations More Humane Through Artificial Intelligence,
45 J. CORP. L. 95, 96–97 (2019).
32
GARRICK HILEMAN & MICHEL RAUCHS, GLOBAL BLOCKCHAIN BENCHMARKING STUDY 11
(2017).
33
Id. As I have explained before, I am aware of the ongoing debate as to appropriate terminology, and, in particular, the discussion around the terms blockchain technology versus distributed ledger technology. Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384,
391–92 (2017). Without intending to weigh in on the substance of that debate, I use the term
distributed ledger technology as the broader umbrella term to encompass both permissioned
and permissionless blockchains, as well as protocols such as R3’s Corda that do not strictly fit
the definition of a “chain of blocks.” HILEMAN & RAUCHS, supra note 32, at 11, 22, 24, 26, 93.
Meanwhile, I use the term “blockchain technology” to refer specifically to those distributed
ledgers that use data structures composed of a cryptographically linked chain of blocked data.
Id. at 11. Adopting these terms is not a statement about the technical accuracy of this or any
other terminology. I use these terms, consistently with other researchers such as Hileman and
Rauchs, as a legal academic, grounded in the premise that all of these protocols exist and are
in use, and that any legal and policy discussion of such systems should account for the full
range of implementations, or explain why the analysis only matters for a specific implementation. For further insight into my position, see id.; see also Tim Swanson, A Brief History of
R3—The Distributed Ledger Group, GREAT WALL OF NUMBERS (Feb. 27, 2017), http://www.o
fnumbers.com/2017/02/27/a-brief-history-of-r3-the-distributed-ledger-group/ [perma.cc/TT5
9-XNWS]; WILLIAM MOUGAYAR, THE BUSINESS BLOCKCHAIN: PROMISE, PRACTICE, AND
APPLICATION OF THE NEXT INTERNET TECHNOLOGY 4–7 (2016) (“Since the Internet is comprised of a public version and several private variations, blockchains will also follow that path.
Therefore, we will have public and private blockchains.”).
34
HILEMAN & RAUCHS, supra note 32, at 11.
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mechanism used to verify transactions, vary by implementation among various
DLT and blockchain protocols.35 Generally speaking, however, blockchain protocols, and most DLT protocols, track transitions in state in order to allow participants in the network to reach agreement about the existence and evolution of
shared facts.36
Blockchain technology is a protocol technology.37 A protocol is “a set of
instructions for the compilation and interaction of objects.”38 Generally, a “network protocol” simply sets the rules that allow networked computers (nodes) to
communicate with each other.39 As a protocol technology, computer programs
can be built on top of, or incorporated into, blockchain technology.40 A smart
contract is one type of computer program frequently used in connection with
blockchain technology, and which receives significant attention from lawyers,

35

There are, for example, any number of different ways to achieve consensus. Ethereum traditionally uses proof-of-work, but Ethereum is moving to proof-of-stake consensus. Alyssa
Hertig, Ethereum’s Big Switch: The New Roadmap to Proof-of-Stake, COINDESK (May 16,
2017, 3:27 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/ethereums-big-switch-the-new-roadmap-to-proof
-of-stake/ [perma.cc/R7ZF-LWXZ]. Ripple and Stellar use “a unique node list of at least one
hundred nodes they can trust in voting on the state of affairs.” DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX
TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN AND OTHER
CRYPTOCURRENCIES IS CHANGING THE WORLD 32 (2016) (emphasis omitted). There are other
mechanisms as well, including proof of activity, proof of capacity, and proof of storage. Id.
DLT protocols may also vary in what activity must be cryptographically signed. Id. at 30. As
alluded to above, the Bitcoin blockchain requires transactions to be cryptographically signed,
while in the Ethereum protocol, computations and programs are also cryptographically signed.
Id. at 30–32. Other variations abound. See, e.g., Richard Gendal Brown, Introducing R3 CordaTM: A Distributed Ledger Designed for Financial Services, RICHARD GENDAL BROWN (Apr.
5, 2016), https://gendal.me/2016/04/05/introducing-r3-corda-a-distributed-ledger-designed-f
or-financial-services/ [perma.cc/5W5B-R9N8].
36
Peter Van Valkenburgh, What’s a “Blockchain,” Anyway?, COIN CENTER (Apr. 25, 2017),
www.coincenter.org/entry/what-is-blockchain-anyway [perma.cc/8R4T-QSUM]; see also
Brown, supra note 35 (“[DLT are] platforms, shared across the Internet between mutually
distrusting actors, that allow them to reach consensus about the existence and evolution of
facts shared between them.”).
37
Carla L. Reyes, (Un)Corporate Crypto-Governance, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1875, 1897
(2020).
38
ALEXANDER R. GALLOWAY, PROTOCOL: HOW CONTROL EXISTS AFTER DECENTRALIZATION
76 (2004).
39
Will Warren, The Difference Between App Coins and Protocol Tokens, MEDIUM: 0X BLOG
(Feb. 1, 2017), https://blog.0xproject.com/the-difference-between-app-coins-and-protocol-tokens-7281a428348c [perma.cc/3MX5-42DE]. For example, the Internet Protocol is a network
protocol that defines the digital message formats and rules for communication among connected computers. Internet Protocol (IP), TECHNOPEDIA (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.techope
dia.com/definition/5366/internet-protocol-ip [perma.cc/KV5J-KB2D]. Email is also built on a
protocol that allows users to communicate with one another; “[i]t’s just a way for two computers to talk to one another.” Ryan Shea, When to Use Protocol Tokens, MEDIUM (Nov. 13,
2017), https://medium.com/@ryanshea/protocol-tokens-1ed44fa89453 [perma.cc/4ZBQ-EX
Z2].
40
Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 333 (2017).
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legislators, and code developers alike.41 Like DLT and blockchain protocols, the
precise implementation of a smart contract can vary significantly.42 At base,
however, a smart contract is merely a “stored procedure” or “persistent script”—
a standing computer program—that says “if event x happens, then execute result
y.”43 Generally speaking, however, smart contracts manifest some combination
of the following characteristics:44 (1) exert some control over assets digitally recorded on a DLT or blockchain protocol,45 (2) take some action upon receipt of
41

Amy Davine Kim & Perianne Boring, State-by-State Smart Contract Laws? If It Ain’t
Broke, Don’t Fix It, COINDESK (Feb. 26, 2018, 2:07 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/state-sta
te-smart-contract-laws-aint-broke-dont-fix [perma.cc/XU7Q-QTHB]; Andrea Tinianow, A
Split Emerges in Blockchain Law: Wyoming’s Approach Versus the Supplemental Act, FORBES
(Mar. 7, 2019, 12:41 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andreatinianow/2019/03/07/a-split-e
merges-in-blockchain-law-wyomings-approach-versus-the-supplemental-act/ [perma.cc/ZJC
8-R6XT]; Andrea Tinianow, Part Two: A Split Emerges in Blockchain Law: Wyoming Approach Versus Supplemental Act. A Postscript, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2019, 2:09 PM), https://ww
w.forbes.com/sites/andreatinianow/2019/03/24/part-two-a-split-emerges-in-blockchain-lawwyoming-approach-versus-supplemental-act-a-postscript/ [perma.cc/4FHK-TYKT]; Guidance Note Regarding the Relation Between the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act and Federal Esign Act, Blockchain Technology and “Smart Contracts” (Unif. L. Comm’n 2019), http
s://www.uniformlaws.org/viewdocument/guidance-note-regarding-the-relatio?CommunityK
ey=2c04b76c-2b7d-4399-977e-d5876ba7e034&tab=librarydocuments [https://perma.cc/JG4
J-25X4].
42
ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A
COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 60–64 (2016) (discussing the various uses of smart contracts,
called scripts in the Bitcoin network).
43
Carla L. Reyes, A Unified Theory of Code Connected Contracts, 46 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2021). Vitalik Buterin defines smart contracts as “systems which automatically move digital assets according to arbitrary pre-specified rules.” VITALIK BUTERIN, ETHEREUM WHITE
PAPER: A NEXT GENERATION SMART CONTRACT & DECENTRALIZED APPLICATION PLATFORM 1
(2014), https://blockchainlab.com/pdf/Ethereum_white_paper-a_next_generation_smart_con
tract_and_decentralized_application_platform-vitalik-buterin.pdf [perma.cc/4Y9D-FA4X].
Others define smart contract as “a computerized transaction protocol to execute contract
terms.” Alex Norta, Setup of Cross-Organizational Collaborations for Decentralized Autonomous Organizations 1 (2015), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277014751_Creation
_of_Cross-Organizational_Collaborations_for_Decentralized_Autonomous_Organizations
[perma.cc/J23L-9X2D]; Richard Gendal Brown, A Simple Model for Smart Contracts,
RICHARD GENDAL BROWN (Feb. 10, 2015), https://gendal.me/2015/02/10/a-simple-model-forsmart-contracts/ [perma.cc/Q5KB-BXYX] (“A smart-contract is an event-driven program,
with state, which runs on a replicated, shared ledger and which can take custody over assets
on that ledger.”).
44
The longer definition I have included here is intended to reflect, for the non-technical
reader, that a smart contract is not just of a singular shape and size, but rather, can be put to
many uses, and, as a result, some smart contracts will emphasize certain characteristics over
others. For more detail on smart contracts, see for example, Reyes, supra note 43; Werbach &
Cornell, supra note 40, at 313.
45
HENNING DIEDRICH, ETHEREUM: BLOCKCHAINS, DIGITAL ASSETS, SMART CONTRACTS,
DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATIONS 167 (2016) (“A smart contract is decentralized code that moves money based on a condition. Any decentralized code can move money,
i.e. cryptocurrency, or effect some other type of exchange, e.g. of digital assets.”); MOUGAYAR,
supra note 33 at 42 (explaining that smart contracts “control a real-world valuable property
via ‘digital means’ ”).
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specified data,46 (3) may be used to build a dApp or DAO,47 (4) guarantee execution,48 and (5) write the resulting state change from the operation of the smart
contract into the blockchain protocol or DLT ledger.49
Developers can use smart contracts or systems of smart contracts to create
DAOs.50 A DAO is computer software, distributed across a “peer-to-peer network, incorporating governance and decision-making rules.”51 Although tempting to assume, given the name, that DAOs always run entirely autonomously,52
actual instantiations of DAOs are far more varied.53 In fact, like the smart contracts that enable their creation,54 simple DAOs are best suited for full automation
while conducting more complex activity through a DAO may require additional
touch points with either people or other technology, like artificial intelligence.55
For example, a hypothetical DAO launched on the Ethereum protocol might
simply engage in the sale and exchange of tokens.56 A DAO can be, and has
46

DIEDRICH, supra note 45, at 167 (explaining that smart contracts are decentralized computer
code that executes after a condition is fulfilled); MOUGAYAR, supra note 33, at 42–43 (“Smart
contracts are software code representing business logic that runs a blockchain, and they are
triggered by some external data that lets them modify some other data. They are closer to an
event-driven construct, more than artificial intelligence.”).
47
William Mougayar, 9 Myths Surrounding Blockchain Smart Contracts, COINDESK (Apr.
18, 2016, 4:44 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/smart-contract-myths-blockchain/ [perma.cc/
G4BW-4NAD] (“Smart contracts are usually part of a decentralized (blockchain) application.
There could be several contracts to a specific application. For example, if certain conditions
in a smart contract are met, then the program is allowed to update a database.”).
48
DIEDRICH, supra note 45, at 168 (“A smart contract is guaranteed to execute. . . . Once
things are set in motion, the blockchain underneath serves as an independent third party and
makes sure that what was agreed upon in the code will be executed.”); see also Werbach &
Cornell, supra note 40, at 333 (“With smart contracts, the transaction is irreversibly encoded
on a distributed blockchain.”).
49
Gideon Greenspan, Why Many Smart Contract Use Cases Are Simply Impossible,
COINDESK (Apr. 18, 2016, 3:41 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/three-smart-contract-misconceptions/ [perma.cc/SN67-HLRP] (“A smart contract is a piece of code that is stored on an
[sic] blockchain, triggered by blockchain transactions and which reads and writes data in that
blockchain’s database. . . . A smart contract is just a fancy name for code that runs on a blockchain, and interacts with that blockchain’s state.”).
50
ALLEN & OVERY LLP, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2016).
51
Id. at 2.
52
“In the technological context, engineers apply the term ‘autonomous’ to computer controlled systems that make important choices about their own actions with little or no human
intervention.” Harry Surden & Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity, Predictability,
and Self-Driving Cars, 38 CARDOZO. L. REV. 121, 131 (2016).
53
See infra Section II.A. Note that this is true of discussions of other autonomous systems
which also consider levels of automation on a spectrum. For example, those researching autonomous vehicles consider a spectrum from partially autonomous to fully autonomous. See
Surden & Williams, supra note 52, at 132–35.
54
See Reyes, supra note 43.
55
See infra Section II.A.
56
Christoph Jentzsch, Decentralized Autonomous Organization to Automate Governance 1–
2 (2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://lawofthelevel.lexblogplatformthree.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/187/2017/07/WhitePaper-1.pdf [perma.cc/J4ZW-P6AP].

21 NEV. L.J. 437

448

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:2

been,57 coded using smart contracts to autonomously set the token price, sell the
tokens, purchase tokens, and otherwise handle the tokens.58 In order for a DAO
to build and sell a real-world product, however, it may need to hire a “Contractor.”59 Depending upon the purpose of the DAO, it may also need people to make
management decisions.60 For a DAO to fully, or at least more fully, automate in
such circumstances, a DAO may need to rely on a form of artificial intelligence
to act in the stead of, or to assist, its human managers.
B. Artificial Intelligence
Like blockchain technology and DLT, many misunderstand artificial intelligence (AI), at least in part, because of the lack of a generally agreed upon definition.61 When speaking in the most general terms, experts explain AI as “a set
of techniques aimed at approximating some aspect of human or animal cognition
using machines.”62 Indeed, many consider AI to be a broad term used to refer to
a large set of information or computer sciences.63 Some of the sub-disciplines of
AI include, among others,64 data mining,65 expert systems,66 robotics,67 machine
learning,68 natural language processing,69 and neural networks.70 Data mining is
57

See, e.g., METRONOME, OWNER’S MANUAL (2018), https://metronome.io/download/owners_
manual.pdf [perma.cc/3YN2-QK7T].
58
Jentzsch, supra note 56, at 2.
59
Id.
60
See, e.g., Carla L. Reyes et al., Distributed Governance, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE
1, 4–6 (2017) (detailing the epic rise and fall of The DAO).
61
Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
399, 403–04 (2017); Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks,
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 359 (2016) (“Unfortunately, there does not yet appear to be any widely accepted definition of artificial intelligence
even among experts in the field, much less a useful working definition for the purposes of
regulation.”).
62
Calo, supra note 61, at 404. Harry Surden uses nearly the inverse definition: “we might
describe AI as using technology to automate tasks that ‘normally require human intelligence.’
This description of AI emphasizes that the technology is often focused upon automating specific types of tasks: those that are thought to involve intelligence when people perform them.”
Surden, supra note 21, at 1307 (footnote omitted).
63
M. TIM JONES, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 5 (2008); Surden, supra
note 21, at 1310.
64
Some of these other disciplines include, natural language understanding, planning, and evolutionary computation. JONES, supra note 63, at 15–17; see also Michael Simon et al., Lola v.
Skadden and the Automation of the Legal Profession, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 234, 253–54
(2018).
65
JIAWEI HAN ET AL., DATA MINING: CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES xxiii (3d ed. 2012).
66
C.S. KRISHNAMOORTHY & S. RAJEEV, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND EXPERT SYSTEMS FOR
ENGINEERS 5–6 (1996).
67
Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 529 (2015)
[hereinafter Calo, Robotics].
68
Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 89 (2014).
69
Simon et al., supra note 64, at 253.
70
JONES, supra note 63, at 250–52.
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the computational process of discovering patterns in large data sets involving
methods at the intersection of machine learning, statistics, and database systems.71 Expert systems are computer systems that emulate the decision-making
ability of a human expert.72 These systems are designed to solve complex problems by reasoning about knowledge, which is often represented as if-then rules.73
In robotics, engineers power mechanical objects with one or more of the other
areas of AI so that the mechanical object can take information in, process it, and
then act accordingly.74 “Machine learning . . . refers to the capacity of a system
to improve its performance at a task over time.”75 Natural language processing
“algorithms rely on tremendous amounts of human-generated data to ‘learn’ how
humans use the written word” in order to “streamline and improve languagecentered AI systems, from translation and text prediction to search results and
conversational chatbots.”76 Neural networks are processing devices modeled after biological neural networks used to estimate or approximate functions that can
depend on a large number of inputs and are generally unknown.77
Of these various sub-disciplines of AI, advances in computer processing
speed and the rise of big data sparked increased interest in, and heightened the
hype surrounding, machine learning.78 In fact, people commonly refer to AI more
broadly when what they really have in mind is machine learning.79 Some scholars
believe that trying to untangle the distinction between machine learning and AI

71

Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 123–24
(2017) (“Data mining is the process of finding patterns among different people or outcomes
to determine what aspects make them similar or different.”); see also Simon et al., supra note
64, at 253 (“Data mining is a process that ‘extract[s] interesting—nontrivial, implicit, previously unknown and potentially useful—information from data in large datasets’ and focuses
on the properties of datasets.” (citing JOHANNES FÜRNKRANZ ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF RULE
LEARNING 4 (2012))).
72
KRISHNAMOORTHY & RAJEEV, supra note 66, at 6.
73
Id.
74
Calo, Robotics, supra note 67, at 529 (“There is some measure of consensus, however,
around the idea that robots are mechanical objects that take the world in, process what they
sense, and in turn act upon the world.”).
75
Calo, supra note 61, at 405; see also Surden, supra note 68, at 88 (“Broadly speaking,
machine learning involves computer algorithms that have the ability to ‘learn’ or improve in
performance over time on some task.” (citing PETER FLACH, MACHINE LEARNING: THE ART
AND SCIENCE OF ALGORITHMS THAT MAKE SENSE OF DATA 3 (2012))).
76
Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias
Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 607 (2018).
77
JONES, supra note 63, at 250–52.
78
Calo, supra note 61, at 405; see also Levendowski, supra note 76, at 590–91 (“Most AI
systems are trained using vast amounts of data and over time, hone the ability to suss out
patterns that can help humans identify anomalies or make predictions.”). Most AI needs lots
of data exposure to automatically perform a task. Id.
79
Levendowski, supra note 76, at 590 (“When journalists, researchers, and even engineers
say ‘AI,’ they tend to be talking about machine learning, a field that blends mathematics, statistics, and computer science to create computer programs with the ability to improve through
experience automatically.”).
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is impossible at this point.80 The goal of this brief introduction to the various
disciplines of AI is not to try and revive this terminology war, but rather, merely
to point out that what is often popularly mistaken as a monolithic technology is
actually quite diverse in terms of its underlying techniques, goals, and uses. Even
if popular use of the terminology remains forever tangled, understanding the differences is imperative for legal professionals because those differences often
hold legal and policy implications.81 Indeed, confusing machine learning with AI
more broadly represents only one area of popular confusion about autonomous
technologies that legal professionals must strive to overcome.
For example, the term machine learning often evokes images of walking and
talking robots acquiring higher order cognitive functions of the type involved in
human intellectual functions.82 However, the “machine” in machine learning
most often refers to a computer crunching data using an algorithm.83 And an algorithm tends to learn “in a functional sense: [it is] capable of changing [its]
behavior to enhance [its] performance on some task through experience.”84 Frequently used to make predictions, machine learning algorithms can automate
tasks almost completely once they have learned to perform their objective function85 well.86 However, even when machine learning algorithms achieve some
level of automation, some measure of human involvement remains. For example,
depending upon the type of machine learning at issue,87 a human may be kept “in
the loop” for training and auditing purposes.88 And even without a human in the
loop, machine learning algorithms, like all technology, remain a social
80

See id. at 590 n.38.
For insightful research demonstrating the link between the nuances of AI and corresponding
legal and policy responses, see Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of
Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1099–109 (2018); Surden, supra note 21,
at 1311.
82
These images are encouraged by popular media—from movies like The Terminator and I,
Robot. THE TERMINATOR (Cinema ‘84 1984); I, ROBOT (Twentieth Century Fox 2004).
83
Surden, supra note 68, at 89.
84
Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1157 (2017)
(explaining that machine learning algorithms “ ‘optimize a performance criterion using example data or past experience.’ In other words, these algorithms make repeated passes through
data sets, progressively modifying or averaging their predictions to optimize specified criteria.” (footnote omitted)).
85
An objective function is an algorithm’s performance criterion. Coglianese & Lehr, supra
note 84.
86
Surden, supra note 68, at 90.
87
Simon et al., supra note 64, at 254 (“Machine learning can take place in a number of ways.
These include ‘supervised learning,’ where the learning algorithm is given inputs and desired
outputs with the goal of learning which rules lead to the desired outputs; ‘unsupervised learning,’ where the learning algorithm is left on its own to determine the relationships within a
dataset; and ‘reinforcement learning,’ where the algorithm is provided feedback on its performance as it navigates a data set.”).
88
Levendowski, supra note 76, at 591 (noting that supervised learning is “overwhelmingly
used to train commercial AI systems”).
81
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technology—that is, machine learning algorithms are used within, and put to use
for, a social context.89
Business management represents one social context in which machine learning algorithms are used.90 At least one corporate board, that of Deep Knowledge
Ventures, appointed an algorithm to its board of directors in an observer capacity
to provide predictions and other data to other board members.91 And while putting an algorithm on the board of directors may be an outlier, some business
models regularly rely on AI to take important action on an automated, high-speed
basis. For example, broker-dealers regularly use algorithms for advice and execution of stock market trades.92 In fact, “[a]lgorithmic trading programs influence
the trading decisions of as many as seventy percent of the securities transactions
executed in the United States.”93 A picture of a wide range of autonomous business enterprises emerges when we consider the range of AI techniques, such as
machine learning, and the increasing capacity to automate business coordination
via blockchain technology and blockchain-based smart contracts.
II. AUTONOMOUS BUSINESSES OF THE FUTURE: EXPECTATIONS FOR
BLOCKCHAIN AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO TRANSFORM BUSINESS
The complexity of, and extreme optimism about, blockchain technology and
AI make it easy to get lost in the possibilities of fully autonomous businesses
operated solely by machines without any human interaction or oversight. Indeed,
this is true of any assessment of the implications of technology in a new field;
the tendency to believe that computers can do more than they can, faster than

89

Carla L. Reyes & Jeff Ward, Digging into Algorithms: Legal Ethics and Legal Access, 21
NEV. L.J. 325, 325, 342–43 (2020) (examining the reality of algorithms as a social technology
in the context of legal technology); see also Selbst, Machine Overlords, supra note 21, at 88–
89 (“In making his argument, Brennan-Marquez inadvertently sets up a false dichotomy between human reason and machines as quasi-magical objects. But machines are designed and
can be deconstructed. Even if humans cannot understand machines in the same way we understand each other, that is not to say we cannot understand them at all.”).
90
There are any number of other examples of how using machine learning in a specific social
context can raise legal issues unique to that context, many of which have been discussed in
the literature. See, e.g., Selbst, supra note 71, at 115–16; Kristin N. Johnson, Regulating Innovation: High Frequency Trading in Dark Pools, 42 J. CORP. L. 833, 855 (2017); Danielle
Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions,
89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2014); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA.
L. REV. 633, 650–51 (2017); Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633,
663 (2017); Jason R. Bent, Is Algorithmic Affirmative Action Legal?, 108 GEO. L.J. 803, 806–
07 (2020).
91
Florian Möslein, Robots in the Boardroom: Artificial Intelligence and Corporate Law, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 649 (Woodrow Barfield &
Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018). Many perceive this move as more of a publicity stunt on the part of
Deep Knowledge Ventures, however, the fact that it happened at all is sufficient to make the
point here.
92
Johnson, supra note 90, at 855.
93
Id.
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they can, drives thinking to extremes.94 In the context of autonomous businesses,
considering only fully automated businesses risks missing the legal issues that
are important to the many businesses that occupy the full spectrum of automation
in-between.95 Specifically, the literature on autonomous and algorithmic entities,
like much of the broader legal and policy literature regarding emerging technology, often deals with hypothetical technology expected to exist but not yet on the
market.96 Technology forecasting can enable legal future-casting to prepare legal
systems for new scenarios. However, many businesses already automate to some
extent using AI, blockchain technology, or both, and they do so in a variety of
ways.97 This landscape of industry reality offers rich context for exploring necessary legal change. To begin exploring these issues, this Part reviews the literature on autonomous businesses, business organizational law, and corporate governance, exploring the variety of starkly different positions taken by scholars in
the field. In doing so, this Part reveals that the gap in existing literature results
from underappreciation of current business uses of autonomous technology and
sets the stage for developing a new framework for understanding autonomous
businesses—one rooted in industry reality.
A. Autonomous Businesses and Business Organizational Law
One strand of literature considers the capacity of existing business organizational law to accommodate and control autonomous businesses.98 Several
94

See Brian Fung, Everything You Think You Know About AI Is Wrong, WASH POST (June 2,
2016, 3:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/06/02/everything-you-think-you-know-about-ai-is-wrong/ [perma.cc/5ZBT-VETH]. This is a particular
problem in the realm of AI. Id. Daniel Marlin, What Is Blockchain and How Will It Change
the World?, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2017, 8:52 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielmarlin/20
17/12/22/what-is-blockchain-and-how-will-it-change-the-world/ [perma.cc/6KKW-7QEB]
(explaining how the blockchain technology cycle appears to rival that of AI).
95
The inverse is also true. Traditional business law scholarship focuses on fully hierarchical
corporations, which entirely lack automation. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural
Holes, CEO, and Informational Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2005). This focus runs the risk of missing important lessons for the law
on the books when the law in action must account for automation in business in a variety of
contexts.
96
For a discussion of this issue in the context of AI more broadly, see Surden, supra note 21,
at 1322.
97
See infra Part III.
98
The work I undertake in this Article to create the autonomous business reality taxonomy in
Part III can be viewed as an abstracted application of the Algorithmic Systems Query (ASQ)
analytical tool Jeff Ward and I offer to lawyers trying to evaluate legal technology for use in
law practice. See Reyes & Ward, supra note 89, at 353. This literature often explores what
Professor Ward and I refer to as the “context ideal,” which “begins by identifying the desired
or required state,” and “asking questions like ‘What results should be accomplished at the
societal, organizational, and individual levels?’ ” Id. at 355. For example, some of this literature explores the ideal type of business organization for autonomous entities, while other literature explores the ideal role of such entities in society. See id. at 353. As we warn in the
article outlining the ASQ analytical tool, and as demonstrated in the discussion of the literature
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scholars have debated whether and how a fully autonomous business could form
a legal entity under existing laws.99 Professor Shawn Bayern was the first to offer
a systematic investigation into the possibility of autonomous business enterprises
through “independently wealthy software.”100 Bayern observed that autonomous
computer software, from computer viruses to machine learning algorithms, already permeate society.101 The introduction of bitcoin and blockchain technology
meant that software could more easily retain and manage wealth independently
from human interfaces.102 From Bayern’s perspective, the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) already explicitly provides for the possibility that
an LLC may operate without any members.103 Bayern explains that this reality
naturally flows from the law’s long history of creating fictional entities and treating them like people for certain purposes.104 Although Matthew Scherer criticizes
Professor Bayern’s reading of the LLC statutes,105 Professor Bayern maintains

on business law and autonomous entities below, “[t]he danger in exploring the context ideal
lies in jumping to the identification of potential solutions, rather than needs.” Id. at 356.
99
See, e.g., Bayern, Of Bitcoins, supra note 22, at 1497; LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, supra
note 22, at 893–95; Matthew U. Scherer, Of Wild Beasts and Digital Analogues: The Legal
Status of Autonomous Systems, 19 NEV. L.J. 259, 262 (2018); Shawn Bayern, Are Autonomous
Entities Possible?, 114 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 23, 24 (2019) [hereinafter Bayern, Are Autonomous Entities Possible?]. These questions quickly turned to, and are intertwined with, questions of legal personhood for autonomous systems. I take up this question in a separate paper,
Carla Reyes, Autonomous Corporate Personhood, 96 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). I
took up a related, but slightly different question regarding whether and how blockchain-based
businesses at various levels of the technology stack could form a legally recognizable business
entity in Reyes, supra note 26. The issue there is slightly different from that addressed by
Bayern, Scherer, and LoPucki because most of the businesses considered in that article, as
further demonstrated below, continue to involve humans at some level of the business, despite
significant reliance on autonomous technology.
100
Bayern, Of Bitcoins, supra note 22, at 1487.
101
Id. at 1492.
102
Id. at 1493 (noting that a system like Bitcoin is not functionally necessary for this possibility; more precisely, then, what Bitcoin enables for autonomous software is the convenient,
“legal access to a functionally independent financial life. It practically enables what in the past
was just a theoretical possibility.”).
103
Id. at 1496–97 (explaining that the RULLCA includes “in a list of events that cause the
dissolution of an LLC, ‘the passage of 90 consecutive days during which the company has no
members.’ ” And that “this provision, perhaps surprisingly, appears not to be a mandatory rule
imposed by the uniform statute.”); Bayern, Autonomous Systems, supra note 22, at 101–02
(explaining how to create an autonomous and member-less LLC).
104
Bayern, Of Bitcoins, supra note 22, at 1495.
105
Scherer, supra note 99, 264–65 (arguing that even if, strictly speaking, the letter of the
statute supports Bayern’s interpretation, allowing fully autonomous entities to form legal entities would violate the spirit and intent of the statute, such that courts would not tolerate their
existence); see also Matt Scherer, Is AI Personhood Already Possible Under U.S. LLC Laws?
(Part One: New York), LAW & AI (May 14, 2017), http://www.lawandai.com/2017/05/14/isai-personhood-already-possible-under-current-u-s-laws-dont-count-on-it-part-one/ [perma.cc
/RSM5-6TZ5]; Matt Scherer, Is AI Personhood Already Possible Under U.S. LLC Laws? (Part
Two: Uniform LLC Act), LAW & AI (May 21, 2017), http://www.lawandai.com/2017/05/21/isai-personhood-already-possible-under-current-u-s-laws-part-two-uniform-llc-act/ [perma.cc/
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that “simply as a matter of positive law, that [his] reading of the LLC statutes is
correct.”106 Indeed, Bayern outlines at least three ways to create an LLC that operates “without ongoing human internal governance,”107 and notes that if “even
one state permits [one of these techniques], other states are unlikely to interfere
with their operation” in light of the internal affairs doctrine.108 Ultimately, Bayern has always argued, and continues to argue, that the ability of the LLC statutes
to create a legal entity “container” for autonomous software naturally flows from
the long history of flexibility and creativity enabled and expected by modern
business organization law.109
Indeed, Bayern opines that an autonomous fictional entity with “private-law
personhood”110 really does not pose that different of a scenario than what can be
accomplished by private parties using technology creatively now.111 Further,
Bayern contends that if an autonomous system did organize as an LLC and conduct ordinary business operations, the public, including customers, suppliers, and
regulators, would be unlikely to discern its status as a business operated by artificial intelligence, absent extraordinary circumstances.112 Ultimately, Bayern
concludes that “there appear to be many organizational advantages, and few systematic downsides, in permitting memberless entities that a nonhuman system
might ‘inhabit’ and use as an interface to the rest of private law.”113
Notably, Vermont legislators appear to agree with Professor Bayern that the
benefits outweigh the potential costs, as the state specifically created a pathway
to formally create a blockchain-based LLC (BBLLC).114 The statute, however,
6J9Z-CLKY]; Matt. Scherer, Is AI Personhood Already Possible Under U.S. LLC Laws? (Part
Three), LAW & AI (June 18, 2017), http://www.lawandai.com/2017/06/18/is-ai-personhoodalready-possible-under-u-s-llc-laws-part-three/ [perma.cc/VB5G-ARPZ].
106
Bayern, Are Autonomous Entities Possible?, supra note 99, at 25, 29 ( “[I]nternal governance is a matter of the law of the state in which an entity is organized.”).
107
Id. at 26–33.
108
Id. at 29; Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 128, 142,
166, 168 (2017) (arguing that contracts that defer to algorithms may be too indefinite to enforce). However, Bayern responds that modern contract law appears uncontroversial to enforce
agreements far more indefinite than the operating agreements that would be required to carry
out Bayern’s LLC approach to autonomous business entities. See Shawn Bayern, Artificial
Intelligence and Private Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE, supra note 91, at 144, 148.
109
Bayern, Are Autonomous Entities Possible?, supra note 99, at 47 (“My transactional technique to create algorithmic entities under American LLC laws . . . is consistent . . . with strong
historical trends toward flexibility in entity structure and governance.”); see also SHAWN J.
BAYERN, CLOSELY HELD ORGANIZATIONS 243–45 (2013).
110
Bayern, Autonomous Systems, supra note 22, at 94 (“For the purposes of this [paper], legal
personhood is simply the capacity of a person, system, or legal entity to be recognized by law
sufficiently to perform basic legal functions.”).
111
Id. at 107.
112
Id. at 108.
113
Id. at 109.
114
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 4173 (West, Westlaw through Acts 1-130, 132-148, 150, M1-M-11 of the Adjourned Sess. of the 2019-2020 Vt. Gen. Assemb.) (creating blockchain-
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appears to expect some human involvement in the organization.115 Indeed, the
first Vermont BBLLC, dOrg LLC, is owned and operated by people who merely
coordinate their economic activity through blockchain-based code.116 Requiring
humans to remain involved may reflect a subtle nod to the concerns of another
prominent scholar in the field, Professor Lynn LoPucki. Professor LoPucki argues that several qualities of what he terms “algorithmic entities”117 make their
potential existence a “risk of existential catastrophe” at the hands of artificial
intelligence.118 LoPucki argues that algorithmic control of a legal entity presents
significant danger because algorithms could “accumulate wealth, leverage it in
capital markets, and participate in the political process—without being subject
to the constraints under which humans operate.”119 LoPucki sees an algorithmic
entity’s capacity to participate effectively in legitimate economic and political
activity particularly concerning because he views corporate charter competition
as reducing the capacity of state governments to effectively regulate traditional
business entities, let alone algorithmic ones.120
In particular, Professor LoPucki predicts that three qualities of artificial entities make them exceptional,121 and thus a greater threat to society than algorithms acting with human collaborators. First, LoPucki believes that because algorithmic entities will lack sympathy or empathy that they will exhibit
ruthlessness to a degree not present in humans.122 Second, society will experience
based LLCs which “may provide for its governance, in whole or in part, through blockchain
technology”).
115
See id.
116
LL-DAO, GITHUB, https://github.com/dOrgTech/LL-DAO [perma.cc/K7FS-XCV8].
117
LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, supra note 22, at 897. LoPucki defines algorithmic entities
to mean those entities controlled by an algorithm, where “[a]n algorithm is a set of decisionmaking rules” operating on a computer as a program that executes decisions in response to
external circumstances, and where an algorithm controls an entity when it makes the entity’s
decisions without human participation. Id. Notably, to qualify as algorithmically controlled, a
human could create the algorithm and then relinquish control, but a human cannot modify the
algorithm.). Id. I note some skepticism at the proliferation of such algorithms. As computer
software, algorithms require regular updates, patches and other “modifications” that may require human activity. For example, in the taxonomy of autonomous businesses infra Part III,
LoPucki’s definition of algorithmic entities would exist beyond Metronome, the most autonomous example included in the taxonomy.
118
Id. at 897.
119
Id. at 901–02.
120
Id. at 889. LoPucki’s chief concern ties into his other work regarding corporate charter
competition. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Corporate Charter Competition, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2101,
2103–04 (2018) [hereinafter LoPucki, Corporate Charter].
121
Calo, Robotics, supra note 67, at 550, 551 (referring to “exceptionalism” as the idea “that
a person, place, object, or concept is qualitatively different from others in the same basic category”). In the context of AI and other emerging technologies, Ryan Calo encourages us to
only consider a technology exceptional, such that it requires new, specific laws “when its introduction into the mainstream requires a systematic change to the law or legal institutions in
order to reproduce, or if necessary displace, an existing balance of values.” Id. at 552; see also
LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, supra note 22, at 952.
122
LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, supra note 22, at 904.
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more difficulty in deterring bad activity by algorithmic entities because they cannot be incarcerated the same way a human controller can, and algorithmic entities
will be immune to social pressures to which human controllers would otherwise
respond.123 Finally, LoPucki sees algorithmic entities as more easily replicated,
making algorithmic entities better able to flee jurisdictions, more difficult to destroy, better at hedging against regulatory changes, and better able to collude
together for the economic detriment of others.124
When Professor LoPucki combines these three characteristics of algorithmic
entities with his view that such entities can be created under not only the ULLCA,
but also the Delaware General Corporate Law,125 the Model Business Corporation Act,126 the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,127 and the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act,128 he finds that algorithmic entities become even more difficult
to control because they will be hard to detect in their various forms and can migrate across state and national borders to avoid detection and regulation.129 Professor LoPucki identifies corporate charter competition as the root of the problem.130 From his perspective,
the natural culmination of charter competition is a system that does not restrict at
all. . . . By embracing the charter competition, the United States has become the
world’s largest supplier of anonymous entities and enabled its corporate service
providers to achieve the world’s lowest rate of compliance with the international
standards designed to prevent terrorist financing and money-laundering.131

When the charter competition problem LoPucki identifies collides with the reality of algorithmic entities, LoPucki anticipates the emergence of a new and dangerous threat to society.132
Despite the starkly different positions taken by each of these scholars, they
appear to rely on a common underlying assumption about the nature of businesses powered by autonomous technology: the businesses are all powered entirely by artificial intelligence, algorithms, blockchain technology, or some

123

Id. at 904.
Id. at 904–05.
125
Id. at 907–10 (demonstrating that under the Delaware General Corporation Law, corporations can eliminate the board of directors in their organizing documents and be operated directly by shareholders; for an autonomous corporation to do this, a “corporate dyad” could be
formed, whereby two autonomous corporations are formed, without board of directors, and
are each managed by a sole shareholder—each other).
126
Id. at 911.
127
Id. at 911–12.
128
Id. at 912.
129
Id. at 924–25.
130
Id. at 952–53.
131
Id. at 952.
132
As Bayern puts it, LoPucki’s reaction to Bayern’s argument that autonomous entities can
exist under current law is one of “honest horror: ‘[t]he survival of the human race may depend’
[according to LoPucki] on rejecting the premises of [Bayern’s] argument.” Bayern, Are Autonomous Entities Possible?, supra note 99, at 24.
124
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combination of those technologies; no humans remain involved in the enterprise.133 For example, LoPucki defines the term algorithmic entity to mean an
entity controlled by an algorithm, where “an algorithm controls an entity only if
the algorithm makes the entity’s decisions without human participation.”134 Notably, “[t]hat a human created the algorithm does not disqualify the algorithm
from status as a controller, provided that the human no longer has the ability to
modify the algorithm.”135 Yet, for all of the theoretical discussion about whether
an algorithmic or autonomous entity can exist, none of the authors offer a reallife example of entrepreneurs attempting to create such an entity.136 The discussion regarding whether and how to form a legally recognized autonomous businesses is not the only line of literature that underestimates the extent to which
autonomous technology already permeates business enterprise.
B. Autonomous Businesses and Corporate Governance
A second strand of literature explores the impact of autonomous technologies on traditional corporate governance mechanisms.137 Authors in this area explore a wide variety of issues, and, as a result, sometimes speak past each other.138
Although an examination of each article touching on autonomous technologies
and corporate governance lies beyond the scope of this Article, this Section provides an overview of the two most prominent lines of investigation that occupy
the attention of scholars in this area, noting the gaps between the literature and
industry reality caused by focusing on a small subsection of businesses using
technology, rather than considering the bigger picture.
The first line of investigation focuses on “platform” companies and argues
that platform governance represents the new, improved corporate governance
model of the future.139 In a series of related articles, Professors Mark Fenwick,

133

See LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, supra note 22, at 897–98, 952; Bayern, Autonomous
Systems, supra note 22, at 95–96; Scherer, supra note 99, at 262.
134
LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, supra note 22, at 897.
135
Id. at 897.
136
Indeed, for all the examples used in building the autonomous business map in Figure 1
below, the closest examples of an algorithmic entity are the Plantoid and Metronome. See infra
Section III.A and Figure 1. The operations and decision making of both businesses are, however, guided by humans at some point in the process. See infra text accompanying notes 228243. Thus, even these very highly automated endeavors do not fit squarely within the depiction
of algorithmic entities so hotly debated in the literature.
137
Again, this literature might be thought of, in an abstracted sense, as an exploration of the
context ideal of corporate governance. Taken together, then, the existing literature provides an
exhaustive exploration of the context ideal for autonomous entities. See generally, Reyes &
Ward, supra note 89.
138
See, e.g., infra notes 139–165 and accompanying text.
139
See generally Mark Fenwick et al., The End of “Corporate” Governance: Hello “Platform” Governance, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 171 (2019) [hereinafter Fenwick et al., “Corporate” Governance]; Wulf Kaal et al., Why Blockchain Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations: What Can Be Learned from the “Digital Transformation,” 1 JBBA 91 (2018); Mark
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Joseph A. McCahery, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, and Wulf Kaal argue that autonomous technologies like artificial intelligence and blockchain push all companies
from a hierarchical and formalized governance structure to a flatter and more
open governance structure based on a platform model.140 While much has been
written about platforms and the platform economy (or, relatedly, the sharing
economy),141 definitional clarity remains elusive.142 Fenwick, McCahery, Vermeulen, and Kaal define platforms in broad strokes, by describing the technologies that underpin platform companies and offering examples.143 In their view,
platforms, driven by the proliferation of emerging technologies, “create[] value
by facilitating exchanges between two different but interdependent groups . . .
leverag[ing] networked digital technologies to promote economic exchange, the
transfer of information or to connect people.”144 Much as Marc Andreesen once

Fenwick & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Technology and Corporate Governance: Blockchain,
Crypto, and Artificial Intelligence, 48 TEX. J. BUS. L. 1 (2019).
140
See Fenwick et al., “Corporate” Governance, supra note 139, at 177 (“Businesses will
either operate ‘as’ a platform or be ‘integrated’ within a platform. The future of the digital age
will be platform-driven ecosystems in which multiple players participate. . . . Given the proliferation of platforms, we seem to be living through a shift from a world of firms to a new
world of platforms.”); Fenwick & Vermeulen, supra note 139, at 24 (“We currently live in a
fast-moving ‘space’ between two co-existing realities: a centralized ‘old world’ and an emerging (but nascent and uncertain) ‘decentralized reality.’ ”); Kaal et al., supra note 139, at 92
(“The central claims of the paper are (i) digital technologies have already disrupted centralized, hierarchical corporate organizations by facilitating ‘platforms;’ (ii) this process of disruption will only continue as new blockchain-based technologies proliferate; and (iii) regulators need to be more attentive to these changes and their economic and social effects.”).
141
See generally Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87 (2016); Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511
(2016); Lina M. Khan, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017); Ryan Calo &
Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
1623 (2017); Michèle Finck, Digital Regulation: Designing a Supranational Legal Framework for the Platform Economy (Law, Soc’y & Econ., Working Paper No. 15/2017, 2017),
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/87568/1/Finck_Digital%20Co-Regulation_Author.pdf [https://perma.
cc/HT8G-WUWL]. While these articles deal with the business and regulatory issues raised by
platforms, a whole other body of literature investigates first amendment in the context of platforms. See generally James Grimmelmann, The Platform Is the Message, 2 GEO. L. TECH.
REV. 217 (2018); Thomas E. Kadri & Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan: Public Figures and
Newsworthiness in Online Speech, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 37 (2019); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598
(2018); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353 (2018).
142
Lobel, supra note 141, at 100–02 (“The common pattern that emerges is a definitional one.
Platform companies adamantly endeavor to be defined first and foremost by what they are not.
These companies are not selling the thing itself: the service, the product, the content. Rather,
they are selling access to the software, the matching algorithms, and a digital system of reputation and trust between their users. . . . [T]he platform economy defies simple definitions. The
platform economy is a system characterized primarily by what it’s not: conventional and
static.” (footnote omitted)).
143
See, e.g., Kaal et al., supra note 139, at 92–93.
144
Id. at 92.
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quipped that software would “eat[] the world,”145 these authors view the economy of the future as one in which platforms dominate—you either operate a platform or are “eaten” by one.146
This view of technological advancement sets up a stark dichotomy. As Fenwick et al. explain, “[w]e currently live in a fast-developing ‘space’ between two
co-existing and competing ‘realities’: a centralized ‘old world’ and an emerging
but, as yet, incomplete new ‘decentralized reality.’ ”147 The difficulty with this
pronouncement is that, as Fenwick, McCahery, Kaal, and Vermeulen themselves
point out, many of the key platforms of today’s economy are owned and operated
by the most hierarchical and centralized companies, including Amazon, Apple,
Facebook, and Alphabet (Google).148 Despite the claims that this emerging and
inevitable “platform age” will lead to new methods of collaboration and governance involving a broader set of stakeholders in corporate decision-making,149
signs of the surveillance economy point to the exact opposite scenario.150 Indeed,
research suggests that even the platform companies that make up the “sharing
economy” replicate the centralized power structures they allegedly displace151—
platform technology simply becomes the new medium through which to concentrate power, centralize resources, and more efficiently serve market demands.152
In other words, Uber and Airbnb remain traditional corporations with traditional agency cost concerns born of traditional centralized management

145

Marc Andreessen, Why Software Is Eating the World, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903480904576512250915629460 [perma.
cc/E8G2-7V2K].
146
Fenwick et al., “Corporate” Governance, supra note 139, at 196 (“As we have seen, there
is no doubt that the platform model is replacing traditional economic theories based on organizations, firms, and markets.”).
147
Kaal et al., supra note 139, at 97.
148
Fenwick et al.,“Corporate” Governance, supra note 139, at 172 (citing Andrei Hagiu,
Strategic Decisions for Multisided Platforms, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Dec. 19, 2013), https
://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/strategic-decisions-for-multisided-platforms/ [https://perma.cc/
T3YN-5ZU3]). Other examples offered by Fenwick et al. suffer the same flaws: Instagram,
Airbnb, Uber, YouTube, Netflix. Id. at 175. Each of these examples are of platforms owned
and operated by a corporation sporting a traditional centralized hierarchy at the highest levels:
a board of directors and suite of corporate officers.
149
Id. at 176–86.
150
See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR
A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019).
151
Id.
152
Id. For additional literature exploring the ways that platform companies, including those
in the sharing economy, actually use autonomous technologies to centralize and amass power,
see for example Abbey Stemler, Platform Advocacy and the Threat to Deliberative Democracy, 78 MD. L. REV. 105 (2018); Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & the Future of Employment
and Labor Law, 51 U. S.F. L. REV. 51 (2017); JEREMIAS PRASSL, HUMANS AS A SERVICE: THE
PROMISE AND PERILS OF WORK IN THE GIG ECONOMY (2018); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter,
From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673
(2016).
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hierarchies at the director and c-suite level.153 The difficulty in viewing the world
as a dichotomy between centralized traditional corporations and decentralized
platforms154 lies in assuming that using platform technology will always decentralize corporate power.155 Technology will only decentralize power inside a
business organization if such decentralization is a goal of those organizing the
business. If not, the same technology can be used to reinforce power structures
just as easily as it can be used to subvert them.156 Further, platform technology
does not stand alone as the sole type of automation used in business endeavors.157
One can only view the market as a straight line of progressively more decentralized platforms158 by focusing solely on one use of autonomous technologies in
business.159 Thus, while Fenwick, McCahery, Kaal, and Vermeulen are correct
in observing that “technologies are well-placed to facilitate more ‘inclusive’ and
‘communal’ models of organization that empower more stakeholders,”160 it is not
inevitable that they will do so. Rather, business founders, owners, investors, and
managers must actively architect a business to use technology to fundamentally
disrupt management structures.
Picking up on the potential diversity in technological improvements to business organizations, a second line of investigation considers the ways in which
autonomous technologies may disrupt, alter, improve upon, replace, or eliminate
a specific mechanism of corporate governance.161 For example, when Delaware
revised its General Corporation Law to allow corporate shares to be issued and
tracked via blockchain technology,162 Professor George Geis considered the potential ripple effects of transplanting that corporate law requirement into blockchain technology.163 Professor Geis argues that if blockchain-based corporate
153

Julia Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm? The Postindustrial Corporation and Advanced Information Technology, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 38–42, 55 (2016).
154
Kaal et al., supra note 139, at 97.
155
Id.
156
See generally ZUBOFF, supra note 150.
157
For examples, see infra Section III.A.
158
Fenwick et al., “Corporate” Governance, supra note 139, at 189.
159
Platform technologies, in the sense of using platforms to flatten middle management, only
occur among the “Managerial Automation Light” businesses in the taxonomy. See infra Figure
2.
160
Fenwick & Vermeulen, supra note 139, at 12.
161
See, e.g., Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance, supra, note 17; Cristoph Van
der Elst & Anne Lafarre, Bringing the AGM to the 21st Century: Blockchain and Smart Contracting Tech for Shareholder Involvement 15–16 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 358/2017, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2992804 [perma.cc/QMT8-7CAG];
Geis, supra, note 18, at 230–31; Anne LaFarre & Christoph Van der Elst, Blockchain Technology for Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 390/2018, Tilburg L. Sch. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No.
07/2018, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3135209 [perma.cc/9L
UC-XGHK].
162
S.B. 69, 149th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2017) (explicitly allowing for the use of the blockchain
to maintain corporate share registries).
163
Geis, supra note 18, at 273.
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share registries enable fully traceable shares, using blockchain-based share registries may enable more responsive shareholder governance models, impact the
nature of shareholder lawsuits, and offer the opportunity to rethink the separation
of corporate and shareholder liability.164 Others argue that blockchain technology
and other digital communications technologies can improve the shareholder voting process, and potentially open greater avenues for shareholder participation.165
Notably, the current literature on autonomous technologies and corporate governance, regardless of the line of investigation pursued, appears to assume that
the aims of automation are the same for all businesses: to enable greater economic returns while also eliminating or otherwise putting new checks on traditional corporate managers. Yet, to date, the literature has not undertaken an assessment of whether industry participants are actually moving in that direction.
The next Part begins filling in that gap by constructing a taxonomy of autonomous businesses as they actually exist.
III. AUTONOMOUS BUSINESS REALITY: A TAXONOMY TO HELP LAW ACCOUNT
FOR THE FULL SPECTRUM OF AUTONOMOUS BUSINESSES
The competing visions of autonomous businesses, both in the literature discussed above and among technological futurists, often discuss such businesses
as though they are monolithic.166 This Part challenges that narrative by exploring
business automation as a function of design trade-offs required of founders, owners, investors, managers, and other stakeholders167 when deciding whether, when,
and how to automate a business. In doing so, this Part discusses thirteen examples of business automation at varying levels of complexity, and maps them by
degree of operational and managerial automation.168 The autonomous business
164

Id. at 274–76. For a framework to use in assessing the broader legal implications (the ripple
effects) of moving certain legal rules to functionally reside in and be autonomously executed
via blockchain technology (a legal transplant of sorts), see Reyes, supra note 33.
165
See, e.g., Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 161, at 5; Christoph Van der Elst & Anne
Lafarre, Blockchain and Smart Contracting for the Shareholder Community, 20 EUR. BUS. L.
REV. 111, 125 (2019); Michael D. Goldman & Eileen M. Filliben, Corporate Governance:
Current Trends and Likely Developments for the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L.
683, 689, 695 (2000); Dirk Zetzsche, Shareholder Passivity, Cross-Border Voting and the
Shareholder Rights Directive, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 289, 323 (2008).
166
See generally Fenwick et al., “Corporate” Governance, supra note 139 (lumping all “platform” technologies into one group); LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, supra note 22 (dealing
with one specific type of algorithmic entity).
167
Arguably, including the lawyers advising founders, owners, and investors.
168
This work of mapping autonomous business reality represents a gap analysis, the second
step in ASQ—namely, in building the map and the autonomous business reality taxonomy that
flows from it, I focused “on the current state of the social context, asking: What are the current
realities of the extent to which the identified values and demands are achieved in the social
context. What are the gaps between the ideal of the values and the reality?” Reyes & Ward,
supra note 89. This gap analysis, and the tool that results from engaging in it—the autonomous
business reality taxonomy, represent the first such analysis undertaken in the autonomous
business literature, and is undertaken in the hope of furthering the discussion toward more
nuanced discussion of the functional system goals of business law, broadly speaking, and
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map demonstrates the potential for wide variance in the level of autonomous
technology used by a business. This Part then evaluates similarities across the
operational-managerial automation tradeoffs made by each autonomous business
enterprise in the map. The result is the creation of the first taxonomy of autonomous business reality, which, although built from a snapshot of a moment in
time, provides a framework for evaluating developments in autonomous businesses moving forward. Finally, this Part uses the taxonomy to demonstrate that
the aspect of autonomous businesses that makes them truly exceptional is not the
mere use of automation, but rather the new business goals and economic models
that autonomous technology can help businesses achieve.
A. Understanding Differences Between Autonomous Businesses as Design
Tradeoffs
Although an autonomous business may sound futuristic, the reality is that
businesses already automate their affairs in a variety of ways.169 This variance
among autonomous entities can be understood as a function of the design
tradeoffs made by the founders when creating the entity. Although different disciplines consider design tradeoffs more explicitly and systematically than others,
stakeholders in many fields must make design tradeoffs when undertaking activity to achieve one goal inhibits their ability to achieve another goal.170 Software
engineers make design tradeoffs when they write code.171 Policy makers must
make tradeoffs when designing laws and regulations that impact competing policy goals.172 Business founders make tradeoffs when they choose which type of
business organization to form.173 Businesses also make tradeoffs throughout the
business life-cycle:174 when designing contracts and policies,175 when designing
workable processes for experimenting with more diverse corporate governance structures specifically.
169
See infra notes 179–83 and 184-227 and accompanying text.
170
Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 164 (2018) (“The
tradeoff thesis . . . applies more generally to any situation in which we’re trying to maximize
a set of values, . . . at least some of the time.”).
171
See, e.g., Tomáš Krabec & Percy Venegas, Trust Design: Balancing Smart Contracts Utility and Decentralisation Risk, 23 INT’L ADVANCES ECON. RSCH. 433, 434 (2017).
172
See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 243 (2016);
Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror,
97 CALIF. L. REV. 301, 324 (2009); Adrian Vermeule, A New Deal for Civil Liberties: An
Essay in Honor of Cass R. Sunstein, 43 TULSA L. REV. 921, 923 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein,
Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1541–42 (1996); Kal Raustiala, Form and
Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 581–82 (2005); Samuel L.
Bray, Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1172, 1184 (2010).
173
Henry Hansmann, Ownership and Organizational Form, in THE HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 891 (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 2012).
174
Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective
Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 9–10, 13, 17, 21 (2001).
175
Pozen, supra note 172, at 229, 233; Rozenshtein, supra note 170, at 163–64, 181; Eric
Rasmusen, Agency Law and Contract Formation, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 369, 376 (2004).
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products,176 when hiring employees,177 when raising capital178—the list could
cover nearly every aspect of a business enterprise. When it comes to decisions of
whether, to what extent, and in what capacity to automate a business enterprise,
the founders generally have two types of automation to consider: operational and
managerial.
By operational automation, this Article refers to the use of technology to
automate routine operations within a business in order to capitalize on efficiency
gains and grow economies of scale.179 Incorporating technology-assisted or robot-assisted manufacturing equipment into an automobile factory represents a
form of low-level operational automation.180 When Amazon uses robots to optimize warehouse efficiency, Amazon engages in a slightly more complex level of
operational automation.181 When traditional financial institutions offer robo-advisor services,182 or companies use chatbots in lieu of human-provided customer
service,183 they fully automate a specific operational process while maintaining
a very traditional managerial structure. Up to this point, however, these are examples of traditionally organized and incorporated companies using technology
to make operations more efficient. Other companies not only engage in some
form of operational automation, but also implement some level of managerial
automation.
This Article uses the term managerial automation to refer to the use of technology by a business enterprise to automate some level of its internal
176

Rozenshtein, supra note 170, at 99, 128; Geoffrey G. Parker & Marshall W. Van Alstyne,
Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design, 51 MGMT. SCI. 1494,
1494 (2005); Geoffrey Parker & Marshall Van Alstyne, Six Challenges in Platform Licensing
and Open Innovation, 74 COMMC’NS & STRATEGIES 17, 25 (2009).
177
Darren Bernard et al., Implied Tradeoffs of CFO Accounting Expertise: Evidence from
Firm-Manager Matching 2–4 (Apr. 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2858681 [perma.cc/ZYU2-MN5J].
178
See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165,
184–85 (2017); Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 606 (2016).
179
Pratik Dholakiya, 4 Ways to Cut Costs Using Technology, ENTREPRENEUR (June 23, 2015),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/247577 [perma.cc/H8DC-TYE4].
180
Paul Davidson, More Robots Coming to U.S. Factories, USA TODAY (Feb. 10, 2015, 12:39
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/02/09/bcg-report-on-factory-robots/2314
3259/ [perma.cc/G7EM-XSF9].
181
Will Knight, Inside Amazon’s Warehouse, Human-Robot Symbiosis, MIT TECH. REV. (July
7, 2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/538601/inside-amazons-warehouse-human-ro
bot-symbiosis/ [perma.cc/AC3J-P4MZ].
182
See, e.g., Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial
Services Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. 713, 739, 741 (2018); Nicole G. Iannarone, Computer as
Confidant: Digital Investment Advice and the Fiduciary Standard, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 141,
142–43 (2018).
183
See A. Narasima Venkatesh, Industry 4.0: Reimagining the Future of Workplace (Five
Business Case Applications of Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Robots, Virtual Reality in Five Different Industries), 26 INT’L J. ENG’G. BUS. & ENTER. APPLICATIONS 5, 5–6
(2018).
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management functions.184 A company need not install a robot on the board of
directors to engage in managerial automation.185 For example, using algorithms
to automatically match drivers with people that need a ride allows Uber to eliminate several layers of management that typically characterize traditional taxi
companies.186 Uber’s user-side app replaces the dispatcher while the driver-side
app monitors the location and activity of the drivers, confirming that they are
only paid for work completed.187 Similarly, in the distributed ledger technology
industry, the financial institution consortium known as R3 created a permissioned distributed ledger called CordaTM to enable parties who interact with each
other on a regular basis to “automate one or more common business processes.”188 Sharing economy,189 or platform technology,190 companies like Uber,
and businesses built upon permissioned distributed ledger technologies like
Corda partially automate both operational and managerial functions, but do so at
a relatively low level.191 Uber remains a traditional corporation with managerial
power centered in the board of directors.192 The financial institutions using CordaTM similarly retain the full range of their traditional corporate governance structures.193 Such companies automate operations to a slightly higher degree than
Amazon does in its warehouses, while also flattening managerial operations at
184

Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 31, 52–53 (2016) [hereinafter Stemler, Betwixt and Between] (describing how Uber uses
technology to flatten managerial patterns). Note that in this paper, I invoke the meaning of the
word “manager” in the sense that it is used by workers—to refer to a structure of supervisors
that report up a chain to the ultimate seat of management, the board of directors, and c-suite
officers.
185
See id. at 53.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
RICHARD GENDAL BROWN, THE CORDA PLATFORM: AN INTRODUCTION 3, 7, 13 (2018), http
s://www.corda.net/content/corda-platform-whitepaper.pdf [perma.cc/9WFR-XZ9M].
189
“[T]he term ‘Sharing Economy’ . . . refer[s] to all businesses that utilize platforms to connect people who have goods and services to offer with those who are willing to purchase
them.” Abbey Stemler, The Myth of the Sharing Economy and Its Implications for Regulating
Innovation, 67 EMORY L.J. 197, 199 n.12 (2017) [hereinafter Stemler, Myth of the Sharing
Economy].
190
Stemler, Betwixt and Between, supra note 184, at 57 (“Platforms . . . link[] sellers of products or services with buyers of those products or services. These platforms . . . are decentralized on both sides of the platform, in contrast to single-sided platforms, which follow Coasian
norms and offer their own products or services to potential buyers (for example, Amazon.com).” (footnote omitted)).
191
See Tomassetti, supra note 153, at 54-56 (describing Uber’s use of technology to manage
operations).
192
See Stemler, Myth of the Sharing Economy, supra note 189, at 205, 207.
193
See Delivering Blockchain Technology to Transform the Way the World Does Business,
R3, https://www.r3.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/US_18_R3_FS_v7.pdf [perma.cc/MG
M3-6GAU] (“The R3 ecosystem includes some of the world’s largest technology firms, solution providers, central banks, regulators, financial services firms, and trade associations overseeing the development of the Corda platform, blockchain for every business in every industry.”).
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the lower levels, or across enterprises. This marginally increased managerial automation reduces transaction costs and enables a comparative advantage over
competitors.
Another category of existing automated businesses increases automation still
further by automating most management and operational functions. Many businesses in this category use blockchain technology in an attempt to disrupt the
business structures prevalent in competitor businesses.194 For example, in 2016,
a group of would-be venture capitalists formed a decentralized autonomous organization on the Ethereum195 protocol.196 The participants sought to use their
venture, named “The DAO,” to democratize venture capital.197 The participants
invested ether198 into The DAO and received DAO tokens in exchange.199 The
DAO used the tokens to eliminate the need for fund managers.200 Instead, The
DAO token holders—the investors—would make investment decisions directly
via vote.201 Famously, The DAO did not live long enough to let the management
experiment fully unfold.202 Nevertheless, The DAO’s attempt to “democratize”
venture capital represents an example of entrepreneurs combining a high level of
operational automation with a relatively high level of managerial automation.203
The DAO automated its entire operation—from holding funds for investment, to
receiving proposals, to distributing invested funds—except for the decision of
whether to invest in a given proposal.204 That decision rested with the sole level

194

Although these examples both use decentralized ledger technology, it may be possible to
build similar businesses using machine learning algorithms or some other emerging technology. I do not intend to narrow this category of businesses to only blockchain-based businesses.
I simply find these examples fascinating in a number of respects, and very useful for exploring
autonomous businesses.
195
The Ethereum protocol is one of the leading public blockchains. Anneken Tappe, Bitcoin?
Ethereum? Dogecoin? Your Guide to the Biggest Names in Crypto, CNN (Apr. 22, 2021, 11:
36 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/22/investing/cryptocurrency-guide-top-five-bitcoin-e
thereum/index.html [https://perma.cc/M8Q3-3477]. A detailed introduction to Ethereum is beyond the scope of this Article. For more information on Ethereum, see generally ANDREAS M.
ANTONOPOULOS & GAVIN WOOD, MASTERING ETHEREUM: BUILDING SMART CONTRACTS AND
DAPPS (2019).
196
Nathaniel Popper, A Venture Fund with Plenty of Virtual Capital, but No Capitalist, N.Y.
TIMES (May 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/business/dealbook/crypto-ethe
r-bitcoin-currency.html [perma.cc/34ZL-9CL2]. I note that this description of “The DAO”
will be very short. For a more detailed review of The DAO’s history, see Reyes et al., supra
note 60, at 4–5; see also Mark Fenwick et al., Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution,
20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 351, 376–77 (2017).
197
Popper, supra note 196.
198
Ether is the native-cryptocurrency of the Ethereum protocol. For more information on
ether, see ANTONOPOULOS & WOOD, supra note 195, at 13–14.
199
Popper, supra note 196.
200
See Id.
201
Id.
202
Reyes et al., supra note 60, at 6.
203
See id. at 5; see also, Reyes, supra note 26, at 388–89.
204
Reyes et al., supra note 60, at 4–5.
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of management—the investors themselves.205 The DAO automated middle management functions to such an extent that the investors themselves remained in
control of the business.206 In the last quarter of 2019, two other entities with business goals similar to those of The DAO emerged as Delaware LLCs: the LAO
and MetaCartelVentures.207
Another decentralized autonomous organization, Dash, operates via a masternode protocol in which participants stake 1000 DASH, the Dash native cryptocurrency, to become a masternode.208 Masternodes operate as full nodes that
validate transactions occurring on the protocol.209 In return for providing these
validation services, masternodes receive 45 percent of each block reward.210 Another 45 percent of the block reward goes to the miner of the block, and the last
10 percent remains with Dash for use in funding the development of the network.211 Anyone can submit a proposal for funding from the Dash development
funds.212 Masternode owners vote on those proposals, and when approved, the
projects are automatically funded via smart contracts.213 Here, Dash automated
most of its operational functions but appears to recognize that it needs humans
to continue to update and improve its code. Thus, Dash uses blockchain technology to allow the actual owners of the enterprise, the masternode owners, to retain
management control of the enterprise, despite its extremely distributed nature
and regardless of the number of participants.214
205

Id. at 5.
Id. at 4–5. As a result, of course, the DAO looked a lot like a general partnership. In fact,
in its ruling on The DAO token sale, the Securities Exchange Commission referred to The
DAO as “an unincorporated organization,” which might be read as recognition of The DAO’s
general partnership status. SEC, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO, RELEASE NO. 81207 (2017).
207
See THE LAO: A DAO SUPPORTING THE BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM, thelao.io [perma.cc/73S
W-4DRH]; Liam Kelly, Investment Sorcery: MetaCartel Launches DAO Venture Fund,
CRYPTO BRIEFING (Dec. 17, 2019), https://cryptobriefing.com/metacartel-launches-dao-based
-venture-fund/ [perma.cc/Y49B-C52G]. I note that neither of these entities appear on the Autonomous Business Reality Map in large part because they would occupy the exact same position as The DAO.
208
Evan Duffield & Daniel Diaz, Dash: A Payments-Focused Cryptocurrency (Aug. 22,
2018), https://github.com/dashpay/dash/wiki/Whitepaper [https://perma.cc/W7TS-572R].
Notably, unlike the other blockchain-based businesses introduced as examples in this Article,
Dash is a base-layer protocol, not a DAO built on top of the Ethereum protocol or some other
protocol. See Which Blockchain to Fork to Start Your Own Cryptocurrency, BLAIZE (Apr. 1,
2021), https://blaize.tech/article-type/which-blockchain-to-fork-to-start-your-own-cryptocurrency/ [https://perma.cc/62RQ-3AW2]; Dash: The Original DAO, BITCOINIST (2016), https://
bitcoinist.com/dash-original-dao/ [https://perma.cc/P753-GP6N].
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
NATHANIEL LUZ, DIGITAL IS THE CASH: UNDERSTANDING THE PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE OF
FINANCE IN ONE READ 41–42 (2019).
212
Id. at 42.
213
Id.
214
Leah Stella Stephens, How to Get Funded by a Decentralized Autonomous Organization,
BITCOIN INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2018, 10:51 PM), https://www.bitcoininsider.org/article/36200/ho
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Indeed, Dash legally structured its business creatively to reinforce the automation created by the protocol while also recognizing the managerial role of the
masternode operators. First, Dash’s core developers work for Dash Core Group,
Inc., a Delaware C-Corporation.215 Second, the Dash DAO Irrevocable Trust
(The Dash Trust), a New Zealand-based entity, owns the Dash Core Group for
the benefit of the masternode operators.216 The masternode operators continue to
vote on whether to approve any particular proposal, including whether to elect
specific individuals to serve as “Trust Protectors.”217 The Trust Protectors appoint the Trustee to act on behalf of The Dash Trust, and also elect the board of
directors of the Dash Core Group.218 Ultimately then, the masternode operators,
through the Trust Protectors that they elect, largely control the fate of enterprise,
just as they would if operating solely via the Dash protocol, without any legal
entity structure built on top. The Dash Trust acts as a legally recognizable governance framework that respects the ethos of the Dash network, while also enabling the network to own property and hold assets,219 such as trademarks220 and
patents.221 As a result, Dash represents a uniquely automated business—one with
high levels of operational and managerial automation—with managerial automation based on the technology that powers the organization and reinforced by a
creative legal structure.
A worker’s collective of freelance software developers, dOrg, LLC,222 represents a business with the same level of operational automation as Dash, but

w-get-funded-decentralized-autonomous-organization [perma.cc/T6J8-HK98] (“Humans are
still making the decisions within DAOs, so you need to focus on the social aspects of communities and figure out how you can become useful to a particular human community.”).
215
Ryan Taylor, Dash Core Group Legal Structure Details, DASH FS. (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/dash-core-group-legal-structure-details.39848/ [perma.c
c/3WH9-JFW6]. Notably, the Dash Core team previously had organized as an Arizona nonprofit trade association, but ran into several difficulties that required a re-organization. For
further information, see id.
216
Id.
217
Id. The first slate of Trust Protectors was elected in the Spring of 2019. Joël Valenzuela,
Dash DAO Irrevocable Trust Completes Trust Protector Election in Historic Governance Moment, DASH NEWS (Apr. 3, 2019), https://dashnews.org/dash-dao-irrevocable-trust-completestrust-protector-election-in-historic-governance-moment/ [perma.cc/WB4M-UA88].
218
Taylor, supra note 215.
219
As a legal person, The Dash Trust can own property, contract with others, and has standing
to sue to enforce its rights. For more on autonomous entities and legal personhood, see a separate paper on that topic: Reyes, Autonomous Corporate Personhood, supra note 99.
220
For more on the very interesting questions surrounding trademarks and blockchain protocols, such as the Bitcoin Blockchain, Ethereum, and Dash, see a separate paper on that topic:
Sean Pager & Carla Reyes, Trademarking Blockchain Enterprises (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author). With respect to Dash, the Dash Core Group owns the Dash mark, and
the Dash Core Group is owned by The Dash Trust, meaning that The Dash Trust ultimately
remains in control of the mark.
221
Taylor, supra note 215.
222
dOrgTech, Ecosystem, GITHUB, https://github.com/dOrgTech/Ecosystem [perma.cc/HWA
4-YVGJ].
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with a slightly greater level of managerial automation. As a worker’s cooperative, dOrg LLC employees own the business, distributing profits in proportion to
the work performed for the business.223 Regardless of contributions to the cooperative’s work or the proportion of profits received, members of a worker’s cooperative each receive one vote for use in making business and governance decisions.224 dOrg LLC reflects these rules and the ethos supporting them through
the computer code that facilitates its existence.225 To formalize those rules while
also obtaining a legally recognizable entity status, dOrg LLC became the first
Blockchain-Based Limited Liability Organization organized under a 2018 Vermont statute.226 This structure allows many operational aspects of operating a
software development business to be automated: sharing client requests, tracking
work completion, accounting for owner profit allocations and distributions,
etc.227 As such, dOrg LLC’s use of blockchain technology also allows for a completely flat management structure without increased overhead costs: the employees own and manage the business such that no middle management or professional management classes exist in the business hierarchy. Nevertheless, the
employee-owners, who are actual people and not autonomous technology, continue to develop software and perform the services that generate business revenue, such that dOrg LLC cannot be considered a fully automated business.
The Plantoid represents a business that automates managerial decisions to
an even higher degree than The DAO, the LAO, MetaCartelVentures, Dash, or
dOrg LLC because ownership itself is automated. Specifically, no human owns
a Plantoid.228 “A Plantoid is the plant equivalent of an android; it is a robot or
synthetic organism designed to look, act and grow like a plant.”229 Each Plantoid
exists in two parts: the metallic sculpture the public sees and appreciates, and the
smart contract code that exists on the Ethereum protocol and powers the Plantoid.230 Essentially, each Plantoid is a metallic sculpture displayed in a public
223

JOHNSON & EMERSON, supra note 28, at 5 (“A cooperative is a business owned and controlled by the people who use its services. . . . But this guide is about worker cooperatives:
businesses owned and controlled by the people who work in them. The worker-members own
the business and return its profits to themselves based on how much they work for the coop.”).
224
Id. (“[A] cooperative is governed on a democratic basis, with one vote per person regardless of investment.”).
225
dOrgTech, LL-DAO, GITHUB, https://github.com/dOrgTech/LL-DAO [perma.cc/A4XH-4
5CF].
226
Biggs, supra note 24; dOrg Launches First Limited Liability DAO, GRAVEL & SHEA (June
2019), https://www.gravelshea.com/2019/06/dorg-launches-first-limited-liability-dao/ [perm
a.cc/7DR3-ZYGA].
227
Biggs, supra note 24.
228
Kat Mustatea, Meet Plantoid: Blockchain Art with a Life of Its Own, FORBES (Jan. 31,
2018, 12:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/katmustatea/2018/01/31/meet-plantoid-block
chain-art-with-a-life-of-its-own/ [perma.cc/MT3K-MCTP].
229
I'm a Plantoid: A Blockchain-Based Life Form, OKHAOS, http://okhaos.com/plantoids/#lov
e [https://perma.cc/XX7R-FKZQ].
230
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place.231 This metallic sculpture is powered by a set of smart contracts, a DAO,
that resides on the Ethereum protocol and manages the Plantoid’s life-cycle and
affairs.232 When a passer-by appreciates the Plantoid’s beauty, he or she can send
a token of appreciation to the Plantoid by sending cryptocurrency to the Plantoid’s wallet.233 The funds received then belong to the DAO powering the Plantoid.234 The smart contracts running the DAO require that when the Plantoid accumulates sufficient funds, the Plantoid will request proposals from artists to
create a new Plantoid.235 Other than the selection of the winning artist proposal
and the actual creation of new Plantoids, the Plantoid DAO automates the entire
art production enterprise.236
Metronome, a platform-agnostic virtual currency and exchange service, exhibits an extremely high combined level of operational and management automation.237 Metronome uses an algorithm to automatically set the price of its product, a token referred to as “MET.”238 Metronome automatically produces, stores,
and sells MET via smart contracts.239 As protocol agnostic technology, Metronome can run on top of any blockchain protocol.240 The proceeds Metronome
creates are not distributed to human shareholders or human managers—there are
no humans involved beyond Metronome’s launch.241 Instead, Metronome holds
the proceeds from sale of MET in a smart contract to be used by Metronome
according to the requirements of its code.242 Even still, Metronome, as computer
software, must be updated and maintained by humans, meaning that non-autonomous touch points remain.243
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235
Id.
236
Mustatea, supra note 228.
237
Owners_Manual, GITHUB (Aug. 15, 2019), https://github.com/autonomoussoftware/documentation/blob/master/owners_manual/owners_manual.md [perma.cc/ALY7-EJLH]; see also
Jeff John Roberts, Bitcoin Alums Announce New Digital Currency Metronome, FORTUNE (Oct.
24, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/10/24/bitcoin-metronome/ [https://perma.cc/EPY9-QEF
V]; METRONOME, https://metronome.io/about/ [perma.cc/5Y8K-UAWE].
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genesis of Metronome, and that the “Metronome Team” works to deliver new software milestones).
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This discussion of autonomous businesses reveals the varied approaches that
businesses can take when addressing the design trade-offs of operational and
managerial automation. As depicted in Figure 1 below, mapping these examples
of autonomous businesses by their automation levels along axes of operational
and managerial automation reveals the complex landscape of autonomous business entities.
FIGURE 1:244 AUTONOMOUS BUSINESS MAP

Figure 1 reveals a layer of complexity not yet captured by the existing literature on autonomous or algorithmic entities. Despite the diversity of automation
in the market, most existing literature focuses on one cluster of autonomous businesses or another.245 The literature at the intersection of corporate law and autonomous businesses, for its part, mainly investigates businesses in the sharing
economy on the one hand, or fully automated businesses, on the other.246 The
autonomous business reality map (Figure 1), however, reveals that in seeking to
reach unique end goals, each business adopts a distinct combination of technologies to facilitate different structural and governance ends. This gap between an
expected future state of autonomous businesses and the current landscape results
from an underappreciation of the entrepreneurial design tradeoffs undertaken in
244

Neither Figure 1 nor any of the other Figures contained in the following pages were built
to scale, nor are they based on any mathematical formula. Rather, these figures are for visual
aid purposes only. Specifically, these figures are intended only for use in symbolically representing industry automation efforts and building a related taxonomy for analytical purposes.
245
See, e.g., text and accompanying citations discussed supra Sections II.A–B.
246
See supra Section II.B.
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designing an autonomous business.247 Even if it is technologically possible to
create a fully automated business with absolutely no human intervention beyond
initial software launch,248 why would entrepreneurs do so? LoPucki believes the
end game of such entities would be to facilitate criminal enterprise.249 Perhaps
another reason to create such an entity is merely to show it can be done.250 The
map of autonomous business reality reveals a landscape of businesses that adopt
technology to automate different aspects of their business to achieve a variety of
different end goals, including to improve the bottom line, provide new economic
incentives for art production, create interoperable technology architecture, and
reduce the difficulty in facilitating a large democratically run workers collective,
among others.251 Ultimately then, the gap between the current literature and autonomous business reality persists because it tends to ignore the fact that the
probability of automating any given aspect of a business is a result of a founder’s
view of how to make design tradeoffs in order to reach specific business goals.252
In other words, the goals of the entrepreneur dictate the types of tradeoffs
they are willing to make when designing business governance mechanisms and
overall business structure. This reality does not mean that traditionally hierarchical corporate structures will not evolve over time, or that their evolution will
not be connected to the use of autonomous technologies in corporate governance.
The autonomous business map in Figure 1 reminds us that business aims are not
monolithic and that the means to achieve those aims vary significantly in practice, including through significant variance in when and how businesses adopt
technology to facilitate governance. In doing so, the map in Figure 1 suggests
that it is not the presence of autonomous technologies in business that may impact the trajectory of corporate governance. In that regard, the thirteen examples
represented in Figure 1 do not represent an exhaustive list. The map portrayed in
Figure 1 should be expected to further populate over time, with, perhaps, a larger
number of businesses employing greater levels of operational and managerial

247

This is an example of how, as Professors Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky put it, “the legal
literature has focused on the effect of algorithms in static mode.” Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky,
The Algorithm Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (2018). Autonomous business reality,
however, “is dynamic, and individuals change their behavior in anticipation of how they are
judged and what the consequences will be.” Id.
248
This, however, is a scenario that this author finds seriously improbable with the current
state of the technology.
249
LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, supra note 22, at 890.
250
See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm,
112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002).
251
Bambauer & Zarksy, supra note 247, at 3 (“Within limits, people game the system for a
range of altruistic and self-serving reasons.”).
252
These design tradeoffs, and leaving open avenues for founders to choose pathways that
respect their goals, have been one of the core motivating factors in my prior work on the use
of business trusts to form legally-recognized blockchain-based businesses, and on creating
public blockchain governance mechanisms that rest in contract and private-ordering. See, e.g.,
Reyes, supra note 26; Reyes, supra note 43.
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automation.253 Thus, the framework begun here, and further developed below—
in which autonomous businesses can be unpacked and better understood by considering the operational and managerial automation design tradeoffs undertaken
by business founders, owners, and managers—will become increasingly valuable as the number and variety of autonomous entities continues to grow.
B. Identifying Trends in Autonomous Businesses to Illuminate True
Differences
Although the map of existing autonomous businesses demonstrates the diversity in design tradeoffs made by owners and managers when implementing
autonomous technologies, trends across entities also emerge. Specifically, at
least five generalizable combinations of operational and managerial automation
exist.254 Further, similarities among certain businesses using these five general
types of autonomous technology combinations reveal three groups with similarities at an even higher level of abstraction.255 Taking a step back to look at these
three groups at a macro level allows us to consider the landscape of autonomous
businesses through a different lens. Indeed, the taxonomy of autonomous businesses created by this disaggregation and re-categorization challenges common
assumptions and narratives in the existing literature. Up to this point, the literature often appears to assume that the unique element of autonomous businesses
lies in the fact that businesses are automating at all, or that they are automating
to a more significant extent than before. Such assumptions construct a narrative
in which design trade-offs are of little import in the analysis. The autonomous
business taxonomy being constructed here, on the other hand, demonstrates that
the most meaningful differences between types of autonomous businesses lies in
the new economic models enabled by technology and the design tradeoffs in
business structures and governance mechanisms made to achieve those models,
rather than merely the use of technology standing alone. The autonomous business taxonomy is outlined in Table 1 and visually depicted in Figure 2 below.

253

But we should also expect additional businesses to employ higher levels of operational
automation and low levels of managerial automation. Where operations require particularly
intricate labor, we might also expect further managerial automation with a low level of operational automation. In other words, the map will likely further populate in all directions, with
the diversity of enterprises reflecting the diversity in business owners and their goals.
254
The total number of discrete categories sits at six, infra Table 1, once Professor LoPucki’s
Algorithmic Entities are added to the end of the spectrum. See generally LoPucki, Algorithmic
Entities, supra note 22.
255
See infra Table 1 (The three groups are traditional plus, distributed business entities, and
autonomous entities.).
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TABLE 1256
Traditional Plus
1

2

Primarily
Operationally
Automated

Managerial
Automation
Light

Distributed Business
Entities
3
4
Autonomous
Mediating
Hierarchy

Mostly
Autonomous

Autonomous Entities
5

6

Fully
Autonomous

Algorithmic
Entities

FIGURE 2: GROUPING AUTONOMOUS BUSINESSES BY SHARED CHARACTERISTICS

The first category of autonomous businesses includes those for which automation primarily resides in the operational realm, while management structures
resemble traditional corporate governance structures. This Article refers to these
businesses as “Primarily Operationally Automated” businesses. For example, if
Amazon suddenly removed all its warehouse robots and replaced them with human workers, its management structure would not necessarily be affected. The
second category of autonomous businesses, the “Managerial Automation Light”
businesses, are characterized by a combination of some level of operational automation and a relatively low level of managerial automation.257 These corporations automate middle-level management (e.g. various levels of supervisors) or
256

Note, however, that each of the categories in Table 1 contain within them a rich variance
in type and degree of automation, as depicted in Figure 2, below. The numbers in Table 1
correspond to the numbers on Figures 2–4, showing where each category in the taxonomy
overlays the autonomous business reality map.
257
Fenwick et al., “Corporate” Governance, supra note 139, at 174–77.
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tangential oversight structures like those required to oversee joint ventures or
strategic partnerships. Sharing economy companies like Uber and Airbnb fit
here.258 The service uses artificial intelligence to search driver or host offerings
and pair riders or renters with appropriate services.259 Meanwhile, the companies
also remove infrastructure like a ride dispatcher or a hotel concierge by automating those functions.260 Notably, Primarily Operationally Automated businesses
and Managerial Automation Light businesses share certain governance characteristics. In particular both types of businesses continue to be governed by traditional structures like corporate officers, a board of directors and shareholders.
Together, therefore, the Primarily Operationally Automated and Managerial Automation Light businesses form a broader group of “Traditional Plus” businesses:
those businesses that at least use autonomous technologies to partially automate
operational functions and may, to a limited degree, engage in middle-management automation, but ultimately retain a traditional corporate governance structure with a centralized hierarchy at the upper levels of management.
The third category of autonomous businesses includes those businesses that
have almost fully automated their services or production process and have eliminated human management at all levels such that owners directly manage the
business. In other words, these businesses automate the mediating hierarchy traditionally thought to be provided by the corporate form.261 These “Autonomous
Mediating Hierarchy” businesses include the democratized venture capital firm
created by The DAO, which fully automated the investment process but required
the vote of the investors to determine which investments to actually make.262
Dash is also an Autonomous Mediating Hierarchy business. While Dash otherwise automated all other operational and managerial functions, masternode owners, trust protectors, and the trustee make strategic decisions.263 The fourth category, “Mostly Autonomous” businesses, eliminate the Autonomous Mediating
Hierarchy businesses’ final layer of management by eliminating owners altogether. Nevertheless, humans remain necessary to perform certain functions such
that, although completely automating operations, Mostly Autonomous businesses do not completely automate all managerial functions. For example, the
258

Id. (Indeed, many of the “platform” companies discussed by Fenwick et al. fall into the
Managerial Automation Light category).
259
See, e.g., Zoubin Ghahramani, Uber AI in 2019: Advancing Mobility with Artificial Intelligence, UBER ENG’G: AI BLOG (Dec. 18, 2019), https://eng.uber.com/uber-ai-blog-2019/ [per
ma.cc/54MQ-SHSB].
260
Id.
261
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 24 J.
CORP. L. 751, 753 (1999) (“We argue that public corporation law can offer a second-best solution to team production problems because it allows rational individuals who hope to profit
from team production to overcome shirking and rent-seeking by opting into an internal governance structure we call the ‘mediating hierarchy’” (footnote omitted)).
262
See supra notes 198–201 and accompanying text.
263
See supra notes 216–18 and accompanying text. Note that The Dash Trust owns the Dash
Core Group, which is probably a Traditional Plus business. Id. This offers an example of the
complexity that can be accommodated by the autonomous business reality taxonomy.
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Plantoid uses automated processes to earn the funds necessary to reproduce, but
requires humans to actually select and create a new Plantoid. Together, Autonomous Mediating Hierarchy businesses and Mostly Autonomous businesses compose a second group of businesses: Distributed Business Entities.264 Distributed
Business Entities share certain characteristics, regardless of whether they fall
within the sub-category of Autonomous Mediating Hierarchy or Mostly Autonomous businesses. Namely, Distributed Business Entities exhibit a high or nearly
complete level of operational automation and a high or nearly complete level of
managerial automation.
The fifth category, “Fully Autonomous” businesses, employ full operational
and managerial automation, but still retain human involvement at some level.
Fully Autonomous businesses do not have human owners or human managers,
and do not distribute proceeds or dividends to humans. Metronome, for example,
sets the price of its program using an algorithm, sells its product via smart contract, and does not report to, or take directions from, any person.265 Fully Autonomous businesses, however, must be distinguished from LoPucki’s vision of a
future state of “Algorithmic Entities,”266 which never experience human touch
points after initial launch.267 Rather, at least one example of a Fully Autonomous
business actually exists (Metronome), wherein humans remain required to update
and maintain the code that makes them function.268 Together, Fully Autonomous
businesses and Algorithmic Entities comprise a generalizable group of “Autonomous Entities.”269

264

I first introduced the concept of a distributed business entity (or, “DBE”) in Reyes, supra
note 26. Although the DBEs discussed in that article were limited to blockchain-based businesses, and although all of the examples I could find in commerce for use in the autonomous
business map are blockchain-based businesses, I do not want to rule out the possibility of
artificial intelligence or other networked technology-based businesses falling into the categories of businesses that comprise Distributed Business Entities. I simply have not found an
example of such a business as of this writing.
265
See supra notes 238–39 and accompanying text.
266
LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, supra note 22, at 897 (“An entity is ‘algorithmic if an algorithm controls it. . . . For the purposes of this Article, an algorithm controls an entity only if
the algorithm makes the entity’s decisions without human participation. That a human created
the algorithm does not disqualify the algorithm from status as a controller, provided that the
human no longer has the ability to modify the algorithm.”).
267
It is difficult to find an existing example of what LoPucki defines as an algorithmic entity.
This is generally because complicated code needs to be updated and maintained by humans,
and even for simple code, a human must tell the AI what kind of program to create. Matt
Reynolds, AI Learns to Write Its Own Code by Stealing from Other Programs, NEWSCIENTIST
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg23331144-500-ai-learns-to-write-its
-own-code-by-stealing-from-other-programs/ [perma.cc/K6WZ-NAA8].
268
See supra notes 237–45.
269
Here, I adopt Professor LoPucki’s term for the broader group of autonomous businesses of
which Algorithmic Entities only form a part. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, supra note 22, at
897 (“An entity is ‘autonomous’ if the entity controls itself, as opposed to being controlled by
owners or members. All algorithmic entities are autonomous by definition. But not all autonomous entities are algorithmic.”).
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Much of the narrative around technology and business entities predicts that
technology will bring an end to corporate governance, corporate law, and business activity as it is currently understood and experienced.270 For example, Mark
Fenwick and Erik P.M. Vermeulen describe the move from a Primarily Operationally Automated business to a Managerial Automation Light business as a
move from hierarchical governance to platform governance.271 However, the autonomous business taxonomy built here demonstrates that the types of autonomous businesses and the design trade-offs made by those that create and manage
them can be further disaggregated beyond a dichotomy of hierarchical management and managerial flattening via platform use. Rather, upper managerial structures remain hierarchical at the board and c-suite level, while operations become
flatter. Operational automation and managerial automation are neither the same
nor are they co-extensive. A deeper move toward flatter management structures
does not occur until deeper in the taxonomy. Instead, many platforms are actually
managed by a traditionally hierarchical corporate structure.272 Ultimately then,
the autonomous business taxonomy developed here makes clear that behind the
curtain of the “disruption” and “automation” hype, the landscape of autonomous
businesses is really much more varied. That variety, and the patterns that emerge
from it, suggests that if something about the use of autonomous technology in
business rises to the level of exceptional circumstances requiring new laws, legal
doctrine, or legal theory, it is not the use of technology standing alone. Rather,
the taxonomy of autonomous business reality calls for consideration of the
deeper implications of autonomous technology for business, recognizing that
those implications may be as varied as the combinations of automation adopted
by businesses today.
C. Automation Is Not What Makes Autonomous Businesses Exceptional
Technology neutrality represents a core principle of law-making and regulation in areas that touch on emerging technology.273 Remaining technology neutral
270

See, e.g., Fenwick & Vermeulen, supra note 139; Fenwick et al., “Corporate” Governance, supra note 139, at 172; Kaal et al., supra note 139, at 92; LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities,
supra note 22.
271
Fenwick et al., “Corporate” Governance, supra note 139, at 174–78, 187–89.
272
See, for example, Amazon, Uber, Google, etc., all of which operate under a traditional
corporate management structure of a board of directors and c-suite executives. AMZN Profiles,
WALL ST. J.: MARKETS, https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/AMZN/company-people [h
ttps://perma.cc/SYJ6-UTR8]; UBER Profiles, WALL ST. J.: MARKETS, https://www.wsj.com/
market-data/quotes/UBER/company-people [https://perma.cc/M7A9-DQFV]; GOOGL Profiles, WALL ST. J.: MARKETS, https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/GOOGL/company-pe
ople [https://perma.cc/4Z6M-QEKA].
273
See, e.g., U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT 1996, at 17, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.4 (1999) (“The
objectives of the Model Law, which include enabling or facilitating the use of electronic commerce and providing equal treatment to users of paper-based documentation and to users of
computer-based information, are essential for fostering economy and efficiency in
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requires law-makers to consider which activities to regulate, regardless of
whether the regulated person or entity uses a specific technology to undertake
those activities.274 Focusing on activity-based regulation forces policy makers to
explicitly consider the tradeoffs inherently involved when making decisions
about scope and application of any given law.275 Occasions may arise, however,
when an emerging technology so fundamentally disrupts the existing social order
that new, technology-specific regulation may be warranted.276 Professor Ryan
Calo offers the idea of exceptional technology as the threshold for determining
when technology-specific laws may be necessary.277 Professor Calo defines exceptional technology as a technology that, when introduced into mainstream society, “requires a systematic change to the law or legal institutions in order to
reproduce, or if necessary displace, an existing balance of values.”278 Whether a
technology rises to the level of exceptional, depends upon that technology’s essential characteristics—“the characteristics that distinguish [a new technology]
from prior or constituent technology.”279 Applied in the context of business law,
the question becomes the following: What are the essential characteristics of autonomous businesses? The existing literature seems to assume that automation is
the essential characteristic that makes autonomous businesses exceptional and in
need of different legal treatment. The autonomous business reality taxonomy,
however, demonstrates that even traditional companies automate in some way.
Automation standing alone does not make autonomous businesses exceptional.
In fact, restating the taxonomy in terms of effects of the operational-managerial automation design tradeoff on ownership reveals the truly essential characteristics of autonomous businesses. Traditionally, governance mechanisms in
business law aim to mitigate the effects of separating ownership from control of
the enterprise.280 The autonomous business reality map (Figure 2), however,
international trade. By incorporating the procedures prescribed in the Model Law in its national legislation for those situations where parties opt to use electronic means of communication, an enacting State would create a media-neutral environment.”); see also id. at 23–24 (“It
was felt during the preparation of the Model Law that exclusion of any form or medium by
way of a limitation in the scope of the Model Law might result in practical difficulties and
would run counter to the purpose of providing truly ‘media-neutral’ rules.”); Bert-Jaap Koops,
Should ICT Regulation Be Technology-Neutral?, in 9 STARTING POINTS FOR ICT REGULATION:
DECONSTRUCTING PREVALENT POLICY ONE-LINERS 77 (Bert-Jaap Koops et al. eds., 2006).
274
Koops, supra note 273, at 82 (“In general, regulation aims at regulating people’s behavior.
It does not regulate the behavior of machines, except to the extent that machine behavior influences people’s behavior. Moreover, behavior as such is not the point of regulation, it is
rather the effect of behavior on society or on other people that is the focus of regulation.”).
275
Id. at 88 (“[A]n appropriate regulatory instrument may be chosen depending on the extent
to which specific technologies should be regulated.”).
276
Calo, Robotics, supra note 67, at 550.
277
Id. at 550–53.
278
Id. at 552.
279
Id. at 514.
280
Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Regulation and Comparative Corporate Governance, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 23, 23 (Mike Wright et al. eds., 2013). Corporate governance has long focused on the divergence of interests between principals and
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shows that specific combinations of operational and managerial automation can
change the level of separation between ownership and control. Indeed, if instead
of thinking about business entity structures as inevitably creating a significant
separation between ownership and control, we invert the idea and consider
whether and to what extent autonomous businesses can collapse ownership and
control closer together, the autonomous business taxonomy offers some surprising lessons.
FIGURE 3: AUTONOMOUS BUSINESS REALITY MAPPED BY DEGREE OF COLLAPSE
BETWEEN OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

As visually depicted in Figure 3, traditional corporate governance—characterized by shareholders who elect directors, directors who hire officers, and officers that hire employees—represents an extremely low degree of collapse between ownership and control. This represents the phenomena described by Adolf
Berle and Gardner Means nearly ninety years ago,281 and which remains the predominate dynamic in the Traditional Plus businesses. On the other end of the
autonomous business spectrum, Autonomous Entities represent a complete
agents, known as the principle-agent problem. Id. “The key idea is that unmonitored managers
will pursue goals that are not in the interests of shareholders—ranging from actions that allow
them to profit personally (embezzlement, misappropriations) to empire building (hubris).” Id.
at 25.
281
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE
PROPERTY 17 (Routledge 2017) (1932).
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collapse of ownership and control—no owner exists to control anything. Algorithmic Entities and Fully Autonomous businesses like Metronome live at this
end of the spectrum. The space between these extremes offers the greatest opportunity for exploring the frontiers of possible new corporate governance structures.
For example, Managerial Automation Light businesses might be described
as a slightly increased degree of collapse between ownership and control from
Predominately Operationally Automated businesses. While shareholders remain
just as separated from management in Managerial Automation Light businesses
as Predominately Operationally Automated businesses, several of the other levels of hierarchy that characterize Predominately Operationally Automated businesses have been eliminated by automating middle management. Fenwick and
Vermeulen’s description of a movement from “hierarchical and formalized governance” to “platform governance”282 helps explore the variety of autonomous
technology tradeoffs made among different Traditional Plus businesses. However, the platform governance explanation ends there because the Autonomous
Mediating Hierarchy businesses collapse ownership and control further by using
technology as the functional equivalent of the corporate form in order to return
managerial control to the owners. Mostly Autonomous businesses represent yet
another incremental degree of the collapse between ownership and control and
might be described as self-owning. Thus, the move from traditional corporate
governance to platform governance is just the beginning of the type of corporate
governance flattening and re-imagining enabled by autonomous technologies.
Distributed Business Entities, for example, allow for the reimagination of
corporate governance structures which enable greater shareholder participation
and control over the course of the business. Distributed Business Entities eliminate the professional manager class and return control to the hands of the entity’s
owners, taking governance to a pre-Berle and Means world.283 Notably, however,
not all entrepreneurs, investors, or venture capital firms are interested in embracing a pre-Berle and Means world.284 Does that mean Traditional Plus businesses
may forever be excluded from any incremental governance improvements enjoyed by Distributed Business Entities? Not if we consider the function for which
Distributed Business Entities and Autonomous Entities use autonomous technologies instead of focusing on the automation itself.
For example, Traditional Plus businesses could build low-technology corporate governance structures that enable owner participation functionally approximate to that enjoyed by Distributed Business Entities. If Traditional Plus
282

See Fenwick et al., “Corporate” Governance, supra note 139, at 174–78, 187–89.
It is worth noting that, to do so, the DBEs on the map and the LAO and MetaCartelVentures
all chose either a limited liability company or a business trust structure, not a corporation.
284
Uber and Airbnb, for example, the alleged platform companies that will eat the business
world, are traditional corporations using technology in innovative ways for their internal business affairs. See generally Alexandra Jonas, Note, Share and Share Dislike: The Rise of Uber
and AirBNB and How New York City Should Play Nice, 24 J.L. & POL’Y 205 (2016).
283
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autonomous corporations adopt innovative board structures and management
practices to approximate Distributed Business Entities-type owner democracy,
without sacrificing access to traditional capital markets, then Traditional Plus
businesses may seize on governance reforms as an opportunity to disrupt the path
of their own disruptors—the Distributed Business Entities. Indeed, recognizing
the role corporate governance reforms could play in this regard may incentivize
greater adoption of novel corporate governance structures.285 Perhaps recognizing what appears to be the gradual trajectory toward a complete lack of structure,
as represented in the autonomous business taxonomy, may enable greater creativity in constructing the corporate form286 and enable a more diverse discussion
in corporate theory, which has been dominated by a discussion of the separation
between ownership and control since 1932.287
In other words, it is not inevitable, yet, that platform governance will eat
corporate governance, or that corporate charter competition will cultivate a threat
to humanity through Autonomous Entities. At this juncture, there still remain at
least two possible futures. On the one hand, Traditional Plus businesses might
adopt technology that enables a transition to Distributed Business Entities. This,
arguably, may shift the whole taxonomy of autonomous business reality toward
greater numbers of Distributed Business Entities and Autonomous Entities. Alternatively, Traditional Plus businesses might adopt low-technology governance
mechanisms that achieve the same ends of enabling greater individual shareholder control. The result, as further explored below, is a framework that may
incentivize the use of low-technology governance improvements that approximate some of the features of the technology-enabled business structures found in
Distributed Business Entities and Autonomous Entities.

285

Corporate governance scholars already argue that “corporations must be encouraged to
enhance the level of communication between shareholders and the board,” and further, “that
the benefits of increased engagement are significant enough that we should consider developing standards for incentivizing, if not mandating, more robust board-shareholder engagement
for corporations that fail to respond to such encouragement.” Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating
Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 821.
286
I briefly foreshadow the implications of the fact that the Autonomous Business Reality
taxonomy appears to project a general trend towards businesses with less structural formality
and the implications for regulation in Section IV.B. However, this topic deserves its own separate in-depth treatment, in order to contribute to the discussion begun by scholars like Andrew
Verstein regarding economic productivity without formal business organization. See generally
Andrew Verstein, Enterprise Without Entities, 116 MICH. L. REV. 247 (2017). I take up that
separate investigation in a separate article.
287
William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L.
737, 759, 769–70 (2001) (describing the dominance of the Berle-Means thesis in corporate
law, theory, literature).
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IV. WHAT AUTONOMOUS BUSINESS REALITY MIGHT TEACH288
The autonomous business reality taxonomy, standing alone, contributes to
the current scholarly discussion at the intersection of business law and emerging
autonomous technologies in two ways. First, the taxonomy challenges several of
the leading narratives by demonstrating their incompatibility with the current industry state of the art. Second, the taxonomy demonstrates that the truly disruptive characteristic of increasingly autonomous business entities lies not in the
technology itself, but in the creative organizational models undertaken by autonomous businesses. However, the potential insights to be reaped from the autonomous business taxonomy do not end here. Rather, the taxonomy can be used as
an analytical tool to assess a variety of areas in business law. Although this Article leaves most such analysis for further research and discussion,289 this Part
briefly undertakes two initial inquiries into what autonomous business reality
might teach business law. First, this Part investigates the extent to which autonomous businesses may incentivize corporate governance reform among Traditional Plus businesses. Second, this Part briefly introduces the idea that rather
than encourage lawlessness, autonomous businesses may actually result in more
efficient business regulation through the use of autonomous regulatory technology (e.g. “crypto-legal structures” or “RegTech”).290
A. Autonomous Business Reality Might Incentivize Low-Technology
Traditional Plus Corporate Governance Reform.
In the wake of corporate scandals and increasing concern over corporate social responsibility, the corporate governance literature recommends many corporate governance reforms, including, for example, diversification of board of

288

The title of this part pays respect to Professor Larry Lessig, whose pioneering work on the
law of cyberspace demonstrated that the intersection of law and technology never only causes
single-direction impacts. Law must account for technology, yes, but technology often also
teaches new insights about existing legal approaches to low-tech issues. Lawrence Lessig, The
Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 502 (1999).
289
I personally plan to, at the very least, consider the implications of the taxonomy for corporate personality and corporate rights determinations, conduct a more in-depth analysis of implications of the taxonomy for corporate governance, and investigate the potential for autonomous regulatory technology (or crypto-legal structures) to improve the UCC filing system and
more quickly address emerging securities laws issues for new types of tokens in forthcoming
work. My hope is that this Article and its taxonomy invites discussion by others as well.
290
I described the potential of using blockchain-based smart contracts to create RegTech in
Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, calling such regulatory technology “crypto-legal structures.”
Reyes, supra note 33, at 397–99, 407–08.
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directors,291 greater director transparency,292 and increased shareholder power.293
Meaningful adoption of such measures by industry, however, remains lacking.
While the autonomous business reality taxonomy makes clear that technology is
unlikely to consume traditional business structures and related governance mechanisms anytime soon, the governance experiments conducted by Distributed
Business Entities and Autonomous Entities may pressure Traditional Plus businesses to adopt some measure of reform. In particular, where the high-technology governance mechanism in a Distributed Business Entity or Autonomous Entity proves useful, and where that mechanism can be functionally approximated
by a low-technology reform, resistance to reform proposals may weaken.
How might a low-technology governance reform functionally approximate
the high-technology mechanisms adopted by Distributed Business Entities and
Autonomous Entities? One of the key insights offered by the taxonomy lies in
the way increasingly autonomous businesses narrow the separation between
ownership and control. What happens when we overlay that key insight onto the
function of corporate governance reform proposals prevalent in the literature?
Many such reform proposals work to reduce the agency costs created by the separation of ownership and control.294 The obvious functional equivalent to the approach taken by Distributed Business Entities is to give shareholders greater
power in managing the enterprise, however no consensus exists in the literature
regarding the extent to which increased shareholder power represents the appropriate remedy.295 Nevertheless, most commentators concur that at least some
291

See generally Yaron Nili, Beyond the Numbers: Substantive Gender Diversity in Boardrooms, 94 IND. L.J. 145 (2019) [hereinafter Nili, Beyond the Numbers].
292
See generally Yaron Nili, The “New Insiders”: Rethinking Independent Directors’ Tenure,
68 HAST. L.J. 97 (2016); Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, “Captured Boards”: The Rise of “Super
Directors” and the Case for a Board Suite, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 19 (2017); Usha Rodrigues, Let
the Money Do the Governing: The Case for Reuniting Ownership and Control, 2 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 254, 255–56 (2004) [hereinafter Rodrigues, Let the Money Do the Governing]
(arguing for one seat on the board to be held by the wealthiest shareholder willing to serve).
293
See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833, 835 (2005); Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on the Effectiveness of Increased Shareholder Power, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
1, 2 (2008); ANITA INDIRA ANAND, SHAREHOLDER-DRIVEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2020).
But see Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from
Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1822–24 (2011) and the literature she cites in footnote 1
criticizing the shareholder empowerment argument.
294
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301, 304 (1983) (“Agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests.”); Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976); Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 231, 231–32 (2008).
295
Compare Bebchuk, supra note 293, with Theodore N. Mirvis et al., Bebchuk’s “Case for
Increasing Shareholder Power”: An Opposition, 121 HARV. L. REV. 43, 43–53 (2007). See
also Fairfax, supra note 285, at 825 (in favor of increased shareholder engagement); Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV.

21 NEV. L. J. 437

Spring 2021]

AUTONOMOUS BUSINESS REALITY

483

increase in shareholder involvement would likely improve corporate governance.296 As a result, scholars offer a variety of proposals for giving shareholders
more voice in management.
One line of literature suggests that, at the very least, boards should be representative of the shareholders as a proxy for increased shareholder involvement.
Indeed, a variety of scholarly work over the course of the last several years reflects a growing trove of evidence that board diversity positively impacts corporate performance.297 Yet most such scholarship simply looks at what Yaron Nili
calls “quantitative gender diversity”—the number of female directors in comparison to their male counterparts.298 Such quantitative gender diversity on corporate
boards represents a step in the right direction, but in terms of a functional equivalent with the approaches of Distributed Business Entities, does very little to reduce the gap between ownership and control. When, however, a corporation
achieves some meaningful level of “substantive diversity,” gender or otherwise,
the board might be said to representatively reflect the diversity of shareholders,
thereby narrowing one type of separation between those that control the organization and those that own the organization.299 In other words, such diversity may
enable management to better approximate and anticipate what shareholders
would want if they could manage the company directly. In this way, substantive
board diversity may enable a very rough approximation of the more democratic
governance characteristics of Autonomous Mediating Hierarchy businesses.
Other scholars encourage increased “board-shareholder engagement”—“a
mechanism for facilitating the exchange of information between the board and
shareholders.”300 While the increase in information may provide greater transparency to the investors’ market, it only marginally closes the degree of
1735, 1745 (2006); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 666–67 (2010).
296
Yaron Nili, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A New Approach to Shareholder Activism, 4
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157, 159 n.6 (2014) ( “Even some of the strongest opponents to Professor
Bebchuk’s suggested reforms acknowledge the importance of some form of shareholders’ involvement.” (citing Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company's Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 69 (2003))). Nili argues
that the debate should really be about “what forms of activism are efficient and what forms
are destructive.” Id. at 159–60 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 160 & n.8 and accompanying
text and cites.
297
See generally DELOITTE GLOB. CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE, WOMEN IN THE
BOARDROOM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (4th ed., 2015); BORIS GROYSBERG ET AL., SPENCER
STUART & WOMEN CORP. DIRS. FOUND., 2016 GLOBAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS SURVEY (2016);
Joana Marinova et al., Gender Diversity & Firm Performance: Evidence from Dutch & Danish
Boardrooms, 27 INT’L J. HUM. RES. MGMT. 1777 (2016); Jasmin Joecks et al., Gender Diversity in the Boardroom & Firm Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass?,”
118 J. BUS. ETHICS 61 (2013); Nada K. Kakabadse et al., Gender Diversity and Board Performance: Women’s Experiences and Perspectives, 54 HUM. RES. MGMT. 265 (2015).
298
Nili, Beyond the Numbers, supra note 291, at 166.
299
Id. at 166–67.
300
George S. Georgiev, Shareholder Vs. Investor Primacy in Federal Corporate Governance,
62 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 71, 75 (2014).
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separation between ownership and control.301 Another proposal for improving
corporate governance involves increasing transparency in the board of directors.302 Others recommend installing one shareholder on the board of directors—
namely, the wealthiest shareholder willing to serve on the board of directors.303
Irrespective of the specific proposal, the goal appears to be increasing shareholder influence on corporate management. In other words, these corporate governance mechanisms attempt to, through low-technology means, approximate either increased shareholder management of the business, as in Managerial
Automation Light businesses, or the level of shareholder control prevalent in
Autonomous Mediating Hierarchy businesses.
Still other scholars argue that only meaningful proxy access—“shareholders’
ability to nominate directorial candidates of their choice to the corporation’s
proxy statement”—will suffice as an improved governance mechanism.304 Proxy
access ensures that shareholders enjoy the real potential of electing a director of
their choosing, and not just management’s proposed slate of directors.305 Proxy
access is also believed to promote diverse stakeholder participation in the corporate electoral process.306 However, even with meaningful proxy access, other
scholars argue that, without an additional nudge, retail investor apathy will prevent most shareholders from participating in the corporate electoral process.307
Proxy access and other mechanisms designed to “nudge” shareholders to exercise their voting rights in the corporation resemble the increased ease of voting
offered by Autonomous Mediating Hierarchy businesses. Even this brief consideration of the connections between corporate governance reform proposals and
the autonomous business taxonomy reveals the first lesson yielded by using the
taxonomy as an analytical tool: low-technology governance reforms can serve
301

Id.
See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2075, 2138 (2016) (“A more promising regulatory strategy might therefore be
to focus not on the substance of compliance reform but rather on the transparency of the compliance function.”).
303
Rodrigues, Let the Money Do the Governing, supra note 292, at 256.
304
Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259, 1260–61
(2009).
305
Id. at 1267.
306
Id. at 1267–68 (“By ensuring that shareholders have a cost-effective means of nominating
directorial candidates, proxy access enables participation by a broad range of shareholders. . . . Such proposals thus ensure that a broad array of shareholders will have the ability not
only to nominate candidates to the corporate ballot, but also to influence the election process,
and hence corporate affairs.”); Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder
Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 56 (“[T]his Article rejects the presumption that expanding
shareholder power will have a negative impact on stakeholders, and instead argues that at least
some shareholders will use their increased power to advance stakeholders’ concerns.”).
307
Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution to
Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 58–59 (2016) (“In particular, we propose to
facilitate retail investors’ participation in the voting process by providing them with a little
‘nudge’ in the form of highly-visible default arrangements that would dramatically reduce the
economic and mental costs associated with voting.”).
302

21 NEV. L. J. 437

Spring 2021]

AUTONOMOUS BUSINESS REALITY

485

functionally equivalent roles to reforms implemented via autonomous technologies. The relative functional equivalence represented by the connections identified above are visually depicted in Figure 4 below.
FIGURE 4: AUTONOMOUS BUSINESS REALITY MAPPED TO LOW-TECHNOLOGY
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENTS

Just as building the taxonomy revealed limitations in the dominant narratives
about autonomous businesses, recognizing the functional equivalence of certain
low-technology corporate governance measures and Autonomous Mediating Hierarchy-type democratization illustrates the limits of more traditional reforms in
reducing the traditional gap between ownership and control. As depicted above
in Figure 4, increasing board diversity, board-shareholder engagement, and
merely installing oversight committees all arguably perpetuate the existing governance used in Traditional Plus autonomous businesses. These measures all offer the appearance of governance changes; however, studies show those governance reforms are more changes in form than substance.308 Without substantive
changes, such corporate governance reforms may move Traditional Plus businesses from the functional equivalent of Primarily Operationally Automated to
the functional equivalent of Managerial Automation Light business, but do not
alter their fundamental status as corporations characterized by an overall
308
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relatively small degree of collapse between ownership and control. The second
lesson from the taxonomy of autonomous business reality, then, is that just as
“platform governance” does not represent the end of anything, including the end
of corporate governance, quantitative board diversity, oversight committees, and
increased board-shareholder engagement, each represent moderate reforms, at
best.
On the other hand, other reforms—such as board diversity that attempts to
substantively approximate shareholder diversity, meaningful proxy access, a minority shareholder representative on the board of directors, and eliminating the
board altogether—all represent corporate governance mechanisms that more
closely approximate the high degree of collapse between ownership and control
that characterizes Autonomous Mediating Hierarchy businesses. As a result,
such reforms offer low-technology means for shifting a corporation from Traditional Plus businesses to an approximation of Distributed Business Entities without increasing managerial automation. Interestingly, when viewed in this light,
proposals to use blockchain technology or other autonomous technologies to reform the proxy system can be understood as merging an originally low-technology governance reform with emerging technology. Thus, the third lesson of autonomous business reality for corporate governance is really a call to consider
how low-technology governance reforms might be combined with emerging
technologies to create a middle ground of truly innovative governance rooted in
both industry reality and technological capacity.
Law and technology scholars routinely caution that integrating law and technology may result in unintended ripple effects.309 Most of the literature on autonomous businesses and corporate governance seems to assume that such ripple
effects will only be present when selecting emerging technology tools to reform
the proxy process.310 For example, Professor George Geis argues that reforming
the proxy system through traceable shares will cause ripple effects in corporate
law more broadly.311 Professor Geis expects traceable shares to alter the nature
of derivative lawsuits, alter the allocation of corporate governance rights, and
require broader recalibration of shareholder responsibility for corporate activity
(particularly negative corporate activity).312 As to that last ripple effect, Professor
Geis points out that if an improved proxy system enables greater shareholder
participation in decision-making, then perhaps shareholders ought to shoulder
more responsibility for corporate actions.313 Others argue that blockchain-based
corporate voting systems may exacerbate problems of majority shareholder
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oppression of minority shareholders.314 Although tempting to assume that these
potentialities only exist when applying blockchain technology to the proxy system, history shows ripple effects can occur in the context of low-technology reforms as well.315 Thus, the fourth lesson illuminated by the autonomous business
reality taxonomy is a need for heightened vigilance for ripple effects in lowtechnology reform scenarios as much as for high-technology reforms.
Other lessons for corporate governance will likely emerge from applying the
autonomous business reality taxonomy to questions of reform over time. Indeed,
the taxonomy can be applied in other areas where emerging technology collides
with business law. For example, applying the taxonomy to the doctrines of corporate personality and related corporate rights determinations exposes the need
to reassess current justifications for the bundle of rights afforded corporations.316
Essentially, the taxonomy can act as a mirror in the discussion on the intersection
of autonomous technologies and business law, forcing us to ask not only how
does business law apply when businesses use autonomous technology, but also,
what do autonomous businesses require us to reassess in business law? In that
regard, this short discussion of the four lessons of autonomous business reality
discussed above merely represents the beginning of the inquiry.
B. Autonomous Business Reality May Enable More Efficient Business
Regulation
Despite the potential to incentivize corporate governance reforms in Traditional Plus businesses, autonomous business reality may also increasingly push
business toward creative business structures powered by autonomous technology. In the event of increased movement of business governance beyond platform governance to the flatter structures found among Distributed Business Entities and Autonomous Entities, it becomes tempting to worry about LoPucki’s
predictions of unregulatable business entities with legal capacity to act in society.
Although an in-depth inquiry into the potential theoretical underpinnings of
structureless business entities lies beyond the scope of this Article and deserves
separate treatment,317 it raises a possibility that should be briefly outlined here—
namely that autonomous technology itself can serve as an element of the solution
to LoPucki’s concern.318
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Just as autonomous technology powers creative business structures, it can
power creative regulation and enforcement. For example, consider Securitize, a
company that harnesses the power of smart contracts and blockchain technology
for regulatory technology to enable compliant token securities offerings and help
issuing companies manage the compliance life-cycle beyond the initial capital
raise.319 Essentially, Securitize uses smart contracts to automate compliance with
the securities regulations applicable to an issuer’s capital raise.320 Say a company
wants to conduct a capital raise, and, for whatever reason, wants to offer some
or all of that capital raise in a tokenized manner—namely, by offering investors
the option to hold evidence of their investments through tokens. The company
sets the terms of the capital raise and obtains the necessary underwriting and
other financial deal requirements as it would for any other capital raise. Once the
terms of the deal are set, the company could turn to Securitize to essentially digitize many of the documents that would evidence the deal after its conclusion.
Securitize, a regulated Transfer Agent, starts by on-boarding investors through
its platform and conducting required know-your-customer and anti-money laundering diligence.321 Securitize then issues tokens to investors that represent their
investment in the company and uses blockchain-based smart contracts to technologically ensure compliance with regulatory and contractual requirements.322 For
example, if shares are subject to a twelve month lock-up, Securitize uses smart
contracts to technologically prevent the transfer of tokens prior to the end of the
lock-up period.323 Securitize also offers a variety of technology enhanced investor management services, such as investor communication channels and automated dividend payments, among others.324
The hypothetical company conducting the capital raise could be a Distributed Business Entity as easily as it could be a Traditional Plus corporation. Securitize’s automated securities regulation compliance tools work just as well for
Traditional Plus corporations as for Distributed Business Entities and Mostly
Autonomous businesses. And while Autonomous Entities don’t have investors,
and thus no need for Securitize’s services, that’s not the point. The point of the
crypto-legal structures for securities regulation compliance in a follow-up paper, and I am
currently developing a smart contract-based UCC Article 9 financing statement (UCC-1 form).
I hope to see investigation and discussion of crypto-legal structures in a variety of other contexts as well.
319
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Securitize example lies in the use of the same autonomous technology that creates Autonomous Entities to automate legal compliance for businesses, including
Fully Autonomous and Algorithmic ones. Notably, Securitize does not stand
alone in pursuing innovative compliance solutions. For example, R3 CEV325 conducted an experiment with the United Kingdom’s banking regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).326 The prototype R3 developed allows banks to
automatically notify the FCA each time the banks issue a mortgage.327 The prototype aims to reduce error and generate cost savings for banks that must comply
with the FCA’s mortgage regulatory requirements.328
Other possibilities for using autonomous technologies to increase efficiencies in corporate governance and compliance exist, but these two examples suffice to make the point: concerns about the dangers of autonomous businesses can
be mitigated by strategic use of the technology itself.329 Thus, even as the autonomous business reality taxonomy makes clear that industry’s current state of the
art lies far from realizing the promise of Algorithmic Entities, it also offers the
possibility of mitigating some of the threats scholars often worry that Algorithmic Entities may pose in the future. And between that future reality and now, the
autonomous business reality taxonomy stands as a call for further research and
innovation in creating RegTech and crypto-legal structures to govern the new
business structures and assets that autonomous technologies can create.
CONCLUSION
This Article offers the first attempt to document the full range of technologyenabled automation at play among today’s business entities. The resulting taxonomy of autonomous business reality reveals exaggerations in existing literature about the effect of autonomous businesses on business law. By focusing on
Algorithmic Entities, leading scholars recommend changes to existing law to
remedy ills that do not yet exist. Meanwhile, by focusing on Managerial
325
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Automation Light businesses, other scholars predict an end to traditional corporate governance when, in reality, such businesses merely represent a small shift
within traditionally governed corporations. Identifying such exaggerations and
the gaps they create enables the deeper and more robust policy discussion required for law to adequately help Distributed Business Entity entrepreneurs manage risk through appropriate business entity structures and corporate governance.
Furthermore, the autonomous business taxonomy offers a new tool for analyzing the potential effect of the many governance reform proposals in the literature on the nature of the core governance issue faced by corporations: the separation of ownership and control.330 That tool forces a recognition that
technological disruption of business may not be the only path to creating alternative governance structures. Indeed, the taxonomy of autonomous business reality points to potential innovation in governance of both corporations and society. By identifying new business structures enabled by autonomous technologies,
the need for new regulatory enforcement and compliance mechanisms also become clear. Rather than paint a doomsday picture of human-less businesses manipulating society, however, the taxonomy sheds light on the potential of the
technology itself to help law keep pace with entrepreneurial developments. Ultimately, then, the taxonomy highlights the ripple effects of ever-increasing business automation and stands as a call for further research into the implications and
challenges posed by those ripple effects.
In this way, the taxonomy of autonomous business reality provides further
evidence that even in the high-technology contexts of Distributed Business Entities and Autonomous Entities—characterized by code that performs functionally equivalent roles as business organization law—the idea of code-as-law remains a subsystem of regulatory norms within the greater legal system. Even as
the code informs the application of corporate governance mechanisms, the law
inversely informs business decisions about which design trade-offs are worth
pursuing. For example, even where Traditional Plus businesses may have previously resisted certain substantive governance reforms, lessons from their Distributed Business Entity and Autonomous Entity counterparts may incentivize more
substantive governance changes. Recognizing such interplays between technology and law underscores the importance of grounding technology-related discussions in the reality of the technology and its actual use in industry. Getting caught
up in the technology hype-cycle suppresses recognition of deeper jurisprudential
lessons.
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